FairVote Feed: Middle East and Africa

Winner-Take-All Elections Exacerbate Kenya's Ethnic Tensions

Thu, 02 May 2013 08:49:25 -0700

On March 30th, the Kenyan Supreme Court upheld the election of Uhuru Kenyatta to the Kenyan Presidency, dismissing claims of electoral fraud brought by his primary challenger, Raila Odinga. While the court's decision was met with some protests and scattered reports of violence, these disturbances paled in comparison to the chaos surrounding the 2007-2008 Kenyan electoral crisis, which left over 1,000 people dead and many more injured. The relative peace surrounding this year's contest, along with Odinga's decision to respect the court's ruling instead of calling for mass demonstrations, have led some to declare the 2013 elections a victory for Kenyan democracy.

Still, the election's results demonstrate that politics in Kenya remain highly contentious, with the electorate fracturing sharply along ethnic divides. Despite concerted efforts to push voters away from ethnic politics and towards consideration of the candidates' résumés and policies, the largest parties in the political coalitions that nominated Kenyatta and Odinga are each closely tied to one of Kenya's largest ethnic groups. Kenyatta is Kikuyu, while his running-mate, William Ruto, is Kalenjin. The pair won lopsided victories in areas with majority Kikuyu and Kalenjin populations. Odinga, who is Luo, and his running mate Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, who is Kamba, won by wide margins in Luo and Kamba areas of the country.

These ethnic divides are more salient in Kenyan politics than any regional or ideological differences. As the New York Times noted after this year's election, "some areas voted 95 percent for the politician from their ethnic group, while other areas, equally poor, with people in very similar circumstances, voted 95 percent in the opposite direction." The dominance of these ethnic cleavages is reinforced by the traditional practice of Kenyan leaders rewarding their ethnic constituencies with land, import licenses, and other benefits, to the exclusion of other groups. Though Kenyatta has billed himself as a reformer, there is little evidence that he will depart from this pattern of ethnically-based patronage politics.

Kenya's largely winner-take-all electoral system exacerbates these ethnic tensions in ways that other electoral systems might avoid. Like many former British colonies in East Africa, most of Kenya's legislators (47 of 68 senators, and 337 of 349 members of the National Assembly) are elected through winner-take-all contests in single-member districts. Because Kenyan counties tend to be much more ethnically and politically homogenous than Kenya as a whole (while Kenyatta received just over 50% of the vote nationally, in most districts he received either over 80% or less than 30% of the vote), minority groups in many of these districts stand little chance of ever electing representatives to the Kenyan National Assembly or Senate.

Non-competitive elections like these are a common feature of single-member district systems around the world. Winner-take-all also often leads to distortions between the demographics of the electorate and the composition of government, as has been the case in previous Kenyan elections. For example, in 1992 the Kenyan African National Union party (KANU) won a 53.2% majority of seats in parliament with just a 24.5% share of the popular vote. In 1997, KANU again won a majority of the seats in parliament, this time with 38.4% of the popular vote.

Kenyans of all ethnic groups would be better served if country's newest constitution, adopted in 2010, had abandoned the British tradition of single-member districts and winner-take-all elections in favor of a multi-member district system of proportional representation. If each Kenyan electoral district elected multiple representatives, Kenyans of ethnic groups that are in the minority in their district would still be able to have their voices heard in government, and the potential for continued distortions between the popular vote and government would be reduced.

The single transferable vote method of electing representatives in multimember districts, which FairVote refers to as choice voting, would provide Kenyan politicians with much-needed incentives to reach across ethnic divisions in order to earn high rankings from voters in other groups. This would have a moderating effect on Kenya's polarized ethnic politics, as candidates would be rewarded for broadening their appeal beyond their ethnic base. Instant runoff voting could provide similar benefits in elections for single-seat offices such as the Kenyan presidency by encouraging candidates to build broad coalitions and reach out to their opponents' supporters, potentially reducing the likelihood of future post-election violence.

The tendency of ranked choice systems and proportional representation to foster constructive dialogue and deescalate political tensions should make it an attractive choice not only in the ethnically-polarized Kenya but also in the increasingly dysfunctional and partisan political environment of the United States.

The Future of Egyptian Democracy Hinges on the Fight Over Its Electoral Law

Tue, 12 Mar 2013 08:20:52 -0700

Over two years since the Arab Spring ousted President Hosni Mubarak and brought the promise of democracy to Egypt, it is clear that that promise is threatened. While most of the media covers the protests and riots in the streets of Cairo and Port Said, the battle that may ultimately decide the fate of Egyptian democracy is being fought over Egypt's new electoral law.

Egypt was scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on April 22, but those elections have now been suspended. The reason is an electoral law passed in January by the Shura Council, Egypt's upper house of parliament, which is now being contested in Egypt's courts.

While it might seem like it would be better for Egypt to have elections under any electoral law rather than postpone them, it is extremely important that Egypt get its electoral system right. An unfair law could create dissatisfaction with the democratic process among Egypt's electorate and harm the progress of democracy in the Middle East.

FairVote has produced a number of analyses on the democratic transitions of Egypt and other countries in the region as part of its Arab Spring Series. As we reported after the last parliamentary elections in 2011-2012, Egypt uses a parallel electoral system in which two-thirds of the legislature is elected using a proportional representation system and the remaining third is elected under winner-take-all rules. The inclusion of proportionally allocated seats had a major effect on the composition of the current Egyptian parliament.

The Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that was banned under Mubarak's regime, received about 37.5% of votes in the last election for the People's Assembly, more than any other party. In the winner-take-all districts, however, their Democracy Alliance coalition won over 65% of the seats - enough for a decisive supermajority in parliament had no other representatives been elected.

With the proportional seats added, the Muslim Brotherhood's share of parliament dropped to 46%. That is still a disproportionate percentage of seats compared to their nationwide support, but it does accurately reflect two important facts about the Egyptian election: 1) The Democracy Alliance had the most popular support of any political bloc, but 2) it did not have a majority of support. The mixed Egyptian electoral system's performance in the in 2011-2012 People's Assembly elections was far from perfect, but it at least prevented the undemocratic event of one group taking control of the body without receiving a majority of votes.

That was not the case in elections for the Shura Council in early 2012, where the Freedom and Justice Party (backed by the Muslim Brotherhood) won 58% of elected seats despite receiving only 45% of the vote under the same parallel system as the lower house. As Egypt's new electoral law was drafted and then adopted by that same Shura Council, it is understandable why Egypt's other parties find the law to be suspect. On February 26, the National Salvation Front, Egypt's primary leftist opposition group, vowed to boycott any elections carried out under the new law.

The new electoral law would not alter the 2:1 ratio of proportional seats to winner-take-all seats while increasing the size of parliament from 508 to 546. But the Muslim Brotherhood seems to have attempted to gain an advantage through gerrymandering Egypt's district map, which is possible both in the winner-take-all districts and in the proportional representation districts. While gerrymandering is typically very difficult with multi-member districts using proportional voting systems, it can be done in Egypt's proportionally elected districts because the ratio of representatives to population is not the same in every district.

The best course for Egypt is to do away with the parallel voting system and transition to a more fully proportional system like those of Germany and New Zealand. That system should have no distortions caused by winner-take-all and a district map such that the number of People's Assembly representatives per citizen in a district is consistent throughout the country. Whatever law Egypt settles on before the next election, though, it is essential that it be fair to all major parties, communities, and interests in Egypt. Otherwise, the legitimacy of Egyptian democracy may be irreversibly damaged.

Israeli Election Results Show Responsiveness of Proportional System

Thu, 24 Jan 2013 07:48:26 -0800

Yesh Atid supporters celebrate their party's successful election / AP

In a result that has shocked many political observers, Israel's January 22 elections saw Israelis cast votes in roughly equal numbers for parties in the current left and right coalitions. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's conservative Likud Yisrael Beteinu party list was expected to cruise to electoral victory, and even expand the slim majority that the right wing coalition had held in the previous parliament. Instead, the results likely will force Netanyahu to form a more moderate coalition, giving the new center-left party Yesh Atid a substantial role in government after its strong electoral performance.

As election analysts marvel over the dramatic rise of Yesh Atid, the untold story of the election is the fluid way in which the Israeli electoral system responded to changes in the political views of Israelis. When the popular tide turned against Netanyahu and the right wing in the leadup to the election, Israelis felt that they had a real chance to change their government, unimpeded by electoral rules. That's because Israel uses a proportional representation system to elect its legislature - a system that is very different to our winner-take-all American system, as I explained before the election.

This responsiveness stands in stark contrast to the intractability of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2012 elections, in which the Republican majority only slightly declined despite resounding nationwide popular support for Democrats. Because of Israel's proportional system, its leadership is fully accountable to its people, something which cannot be said for the American Congress.

That is not to imply that the Israeli electoral system had a perfect showing on Tuesday, as it exhibited many of the problems that I noted in my prior post. There were seven parties that received less than 6% but more than 2% (the threshold for election) of the vote, making for a complicated coalition-building process. Furthermore, Israelis were not able to choose any of the specific representatives who will be seated in the Knesset in the general election due to Israel's use of a closed party list system.

While there are many groups that are working toward electoral reform in Israel, no one is seriously proposing switching to a single-member district, winner-take-all model as we use in the U.S. One prominent coalition of reform groups, called Save Israeli Democracy, is advocating dividing Israel into medium-sized multi-member districts using proportional systems - a system very similar to FairVote's Fair Voting Plan for the U.S. House.

Israel's system may not be perfect, but contrasting the outcomes of November 6 and January 22 shows that it is far better than the American model at responding to the will of its voters.

Everything You Need to Know About Israeli Elections Before Election Day

Fri, 04 Jan 2013 11:18:02 -0800

On January 22, 2013, Israel will hold its first parliamentary elections in nearly four years. Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for early elections in October 2012 in response to the Knesset's inability to pass a budget, in an effort to avoid a year-long political crisis before the next regularly scheduled election.

The results of the Israeli election are of interest to many Americans, as they will have significant ramifications for American foreign policy and the future of American interests in the Middle East. For backers of proportional representation in the United States, the election also provides an opportunity to explain how American reform proposals differ from the oft-criticized Israeli system - and that even in Israel, no one would seriously propose switching to winner-take-all election methods.

Understanding the Israeli electoral process is not easy when coming from an American perspective, however. That's because Israeli elections are nothing like American elections. The election in Israel this January will be different from the election held last November in the U.S. in almost every conceivable sense.

Here are the most important differences:

1. Who Israelis Vote For

The United States uses a presidential system of government, meaning that there are distinct executive and legislative branches of government. President Barack Obama, the head of state and holder of executive power, is entirely independent of Congress and is elected independently. Israel, meanwhile, uses a parliamentary system, in which the executive comes from and is accountable to the legislature. Note that using a parliamentary system does not necessarily imply using proportional representation to elect the parliament - the United Kingdom, for instance, has a parliamentary system but does not use proportional representation.

Within the legislature, the United States has two houses: an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the House of Representatives. Israel's parliament is unicameral; there is just one house for voters to elect, known as the Knesset.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a member of the legislature, and is elected through parliamentary elections. On January 22, Israelis will cast their ballots for who they want to represent them in parliament, not directly to remove or re-elect Netanyahu. When Netanyahu was first elected prime minister in the 1990s, Israel was experimenting with a direct election of the prime minister. But that system was ultimately rejected in favor of returning to a more traditional parliamentary system.

2. What Israelis Vote On

Both the United States and Israel have what can be described as a left-right political spectrum, but the issues that define the two spectra are different. The left and the right in the U.S. are currently defined primarily by economic and social issues, with the leftist Democrats supporting a larger role for government in economic issues and less restrictive social policies and the right-wing Republicans taking opposite stances. In the 2012 election, foreign policy and security policy were far from the center of political debate, and there was little discernible difference between the two major parties on those issues.

In Israel, which constantly faces the threat of renewed violence (and, in fact, recently emerged from another military conflict in Gaza), security policy and the question of Palestine are foremost in the minds of voters and thus are the issues from which the political spectrum is primarily derived. On the left are the doves, traditionally led by the Labor party, who are more willing to make concessions for peace. On the right are the hawks, including Prime Minister Netanyahu's Likud party and Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party (the two parties have merged into one list for the upcoming election), who are more interested in protecting Israel's national interests even at the cost of further military action. A centrist party, Kadima, won the most seats in the last election in 2009 but collapsed in 2012 and is unlikely to be a significant power in the next government.

There are other salient issues, of course - the small but politically active religious Orthodox community creates another dimension in the political spectrum, and recent economic problems in Israel have increased the importance of economic concerns for voters. These remain secondary to the security issue, however.

3. When Israelis Vote

The United States has constitutionally mandated election terms and a statutorily defined congressional election date. The President is elected every four years and the House is elected every two years on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November, with Senate seats elected every six years (a third being elected in each two-year cycle). Elected officials in the U.S. cannot call for early elections.

As the timing of the 2013 Israeli elections shows, that is not the case in Israel. The members of the Knesset are elected to four year terms, but elections are often called and governments dissolved before those four years end. While such a system is often seen as less stable than the American version, it provides the Israeli government with more flexibility to hold elections at convenient times so as to prevent long periods of ineffective government - as was the case with Prime Minister Netanyahu decision to call for elections last October.

4. How Israelis Vote

The electoral system of Israel is, naturally, of particular interest to FairVote. Israel uses a national closed party list form of proportional representation to elect its government, in contrast to the winner-take-all, single-member district method used by the United States to elect its House of Representatives.

On January 22, Israelis will not cast their votes for specific members of the Knesset. Instead, they will vote for a party - or rather, for the list of candidates selected and ranked by that party to represent itself in the Knesset. The system is a closed list variant of proportional representation, meaning that voters will not be able to vote for their preferred candidates within the party lists on election day. Elections are held nationally - there are no smaller geographic districts, so all Israelis' votes are pooled together.

Israel has a threshold of just 2% for election to the Knesset, meaning that a party needs at least 2% of the nationwide vote to be represented in parliament. That threshold is one of the lowest in the world, and leads to a parliament that very accurately represents the votes of Israelis. The difference between that system and that of the U.S., where essentially only two political viewpoints are represented in Congress, is stark.

Evaluating Israel's Electoral System

While FairVote supports forms of proportional representation for electing legislatures, the case of Israel illustrates the fact that any form of PR is not always a panacea for all electoral problems. There are many legitimate concerns to be raised with the current Israeli electoral system that point to ways that the system could be improved, although we would never support removing the proportional system entirely.

Firstly, the closed list method limits the ability of voters to choose who actually represents them in parliament, and creates a perception of an opaque process controlled by back-room deals among party leaders. Furthermore, the lack of any discrete geographic districts makes it harder for Israelis to feel like they have an elected representative who is accountable to them and understands the issues relevant to their area. The low threshold for election to the Knesset minimizes the distortion between party seats and party votes, but - especially when used in tandem with closed national lists - it also creates a situation in which many small parties hold a few seats, making it difficult for major parties to form a governing coalition.

Perhaps most significantly for secular Jews inside and outside of Israel, the combination of a parliamentary system, proportional representation, and Israel's unconventional left-right spectrum have given the Orthodox Jewish minority a disproportionate amount of power in the Knesset. Because both the doves and the hawks need the Orthodox parties in order to form a coalition with a majority of seats in the Knesset, the religious parties are able to win enormous concessions in exchange for their cooperation. In one controversial case, they secured passage of the Tal Law (later deemed unconstitutional by the High Court of Justice) that exempted young Orthodox students from otherwise-mandatory military service. The more secular parties in Israel could, of course, always choose to come together to oppose these concessions, but generally have chosen not to do so due to the dominant importance of security policy issues.

For all its faults, however, criticism of the Israeli electoral system has often been overblown. Israel has remarkable diversity, with citizens having emigrated from around the world and from a variety of cultural traditions. In a state in which it would have been all too easy to design an electoral system that marginalized inconvenient minority groups - from Arab Israelis, to the Ultra-Orthodox, to the large population of post-Soviet Union Russian immigrants - Israel's proportional electoral system has ensured that all of its disparate constituencies have a voice in government. That is a value that should not be understated, even if the January 22 election and its aftermath feel chaotic and unstable to American eyes.

For more information on Israeli elections, see FairVote's past analysis and Professor Matthew Shugart's work on Israel at Fruits and Votes.

Libya's 'Hybrid' Election Rules and Why They Are Less Than Ideal

Thu, 05 Jul 2012 13:21:53 -0700

On July 7, eight months after Colonel Moammar Ghaddafi's death, Libya will hold its first democratic election since 1964 —an event designed to begin the nation's transition from autocracy to democracy. Libyans will choose from 2,500 candidates and 142 political parties to fill its 200-seat General National Congress (GNC). Thereafter, the GNC will select a prime minister and create a 60-member committee responsible for drafting a new constitution. Elections for a new parliament then would be held some eighteen months later.

The election rules have been described as a "hybrid system," as the Assembly will be partially elected through party-list proportional representation (PR) and partially through a plurality contest in winner-take-all, one-seat districts. Unlike mixed member systems in nations like Germany and New Zealand, the allocation of proportional representation seats will not reflect the outcomes in the districts—meaning that the political forces that win the most district seats may well also win the most party list seats and be over-represented overall.

Specifically, as Amir Taheri in the New York Post explains, Libyans will choose 80 seats by proportional representation from among conservative, liberal, socialist, Islamist and monarchist party lists. Another 120 seats will be elected by winner-take-all in one-seat districts.

This mixed system was apparently designed to balance representation of geographic areas and political interests, factoring in widely differing levels of social organization and rates of voter turnout in a country that for so long didn't hold elections. Some were concerned that electing representatives solely through a national party list form of proportional representation could over-represent better-educated voters in cities. Winner take-all elections guarantee representatives come from across the country, but at the same time, they advantage well-financed or organized parties and likely would greatly distort party representation—just as was the case in Egypt's hybrid system last fall as detailed by FairVote.

"Libya could have found better ways to provide a balance of representation," commented FairVote executive director Rob Richie. "As one example, rather than 120 winner-take-all districts, five representatives each could have been elected by a proportional system from 24 districts, thereby allowing more shared representation within different parts of the country rather than the more polarized results likely to come from winner-take-all elections. Certainly for the long-term, Libya would be wise to avoid winner-take-all elections."

In addition to ideological sprawl, the election rules are designed to promote female representation by requiring parties to designate half their candidacies to women. Despite these rules, Taheri reports that "women are still unlikely to end up with more than 10 to 15 percent of the seats [as it is] hard to find women candidates outside the larger cities."

In theory, Libya's hybrid election system could still engender relatively fair representation. However, an unbalanced Congress could stir new bouts of public unrest, especially considering that Libyan communities are known to mistrust one another. All bets are off until the votes are tallied.

Hanging by a Thread: Egyptian Democracy After the June 18 Coup

Fri, 15 Jun 2012 06:27:35 -0700

Last week, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi became the first democratically elected president of Egypt's post-Mubarak era, defeating his major competitor--Mubarak loyalist Ahmed Shafiq--by a narrow margin of 51.7% to 48.3%, although both sides have challenged the fairness of the tally.

Morsi's hands will be tied despite his holding the presidential title. On June 18, in the midst of the presidential election, the Supreme Council of the Arab Forces (SCAF) dissolved the democratically elected parliament. Not coincidentally, Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood allies controlled nearly half the seats in the People's Assembly.

That day, SCAF also assigned itself broader constitutional powers at the expense of the president. For example, the Council can now veto articles drafted for the new constitution. It can also dissolve elected legislative assemblies and create new ones.

SCAF's string of constitutional addendums--a move that has been labeled a "military coup"--could have dire consequences for Egypt's democratic transition going forward. Given that SCAF's new legislative powers are supposed to disappear when a new parliament is elected, SCAF has incentives to prevent future parliamentary elections. In such an event, the president would be a weak check on SCAF's undemocratic inclinations. Only time will tell, but safeguarding democratic procedures could be an uphill battle in the aftermath of last week's events.

A FairVote blog series has covered the trajectory of the Arab Spring movement from its beginning, with a special focus on the impact of choices about voting rules and their impact in the parliamentary and presidential vote. At this point, however, the question is whether Egypt will have even a pretense of democratic elections, not how best to hold to them.

FairVote's Rob Richie commented today, "Egypt possibly could have avoided this crisis by adopting a fairer parliamentary election system with all seats elected by proportional representation, along with a fairer presidential election. It could have established a basic code of human rights that no elected government could have challenged without changing the constitution. As it is, the democratic movement in Egypt hangs by a thread."

Lessons Learned from Egypt's Presidential Runoff: The Case for Using an Instant Runoff Ballot

Fri, 15 Jun 2012 06:27:39 -0700

The divisive first round of Egypt's inaugural post-Mubarak presidential election has sparked mass protests, corroborating the need for fairer democratic procedures. As a country still undergoing democratic transition, this election--if its lessons are taken seriously--could determine the quality of Egyptian democracy going forward.

Last month, thirteen candidates vied to become Egypt's first democratically elected president. Like most presidential democracies, Egypt used a national popular vote for president, with a runoff between the top two finishers if no candidate won more than 50% of the first round vote. The build-up to the vote had controversial elements, including several leading candidates being denied a chance to run, but hopes were high for a reasonably fair election.

As none of the contenders won fifty percent of the vote--or even a quarter of the vote--the top two candidates will go head-to-head in a runoff election slated for June 16 and 17. The runoff will pit two polarizing candidates against each other, neither of whom represents most of those who gathered in Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring protests--a fact that is stirring frustration throughout the country, particularly among those active in the protests.

The runoff will be a contest between Mohammed Morsi--chair of the Muslim Brotherhood, who won 5.7 million votes (24.8%)--and Ahmed Shafiq, who served as prime minister under Mubarak's regime and won 5.5 million votes (23.7%).

Many Egyptians fear that either runoff victor will not be representative of the revolution and a step backwards for democratic reform. Some argue that Shafiq will pander to Mubarak's loyalists and reinstate policies of the old guard, while a Morsi victory would tip the balance of power toward Islamists, whose Freedom and Justice Party already controls Parliament (although just today that parliament has been disbanded by Egypt's high court).

Five candidates received nearly all of the votes cast in the first round. Collectively, almost forty percent of first round votes favored the two leading candidates receiving the backing of most leaders of last year's revolution--Hamdeen Sabahi and Abol Fotouh. Sabahi, a leftist opponent of Mubarak, placed third in the first round contest with 20.7%. Fotouh, a more moderate Islamist leader, finished with 17.5%. (Although backed by many of least year's leaders of Arab Spring, he also received the endorsement of the Salafi Al-Nour party, which is the most conservative Islamist party.) The candidate in fifth garnered 11.1%, Amr Moussa, is the former head of the Arab League and backed by many more secular Egyptians.

Although he only fell short of winning the second-place position by 2.9%, or 700,000 votes, Sabahi is out of the race. As a result, liberals, socialists, and moderate Islamists--comprising a majority of the electorate--feel disenfranchised.

The first round results, which are not only polarizing but also contradict the moderate majority, signal a flaw in Egypt's election rules. It seems that use of instant runoff voting (IRV) ballots, whereby voters rank their preferred candidates, would produce fairer outcomes. IRV would prevent against the "spoiler effect," ensuring the electorate that their votes for third party candidates are not wasted. Moreover, if Egyptians could rank their preferences, a majority of votes would likely be redistributed toward Sabahi--who seems to have been less polarizing than Shafiq and Morsi.

As IRV elects the candidate who earns the majority of the electorate's votes, it would be an effective remedy to a presidential race that has disenfranchised the majority of Egyptians. Although IRV is typically used in one round of voting, it would also have marked a major improvement if built into a two round system. The use of IRV in the final round could have allowed more than two candidates to advance--Morsi, Shafiq, and Sabahi, or perhaps adding Fotouh as a fourth candidate--presenting more choice and more opportunities to build coalitions in the final round. Alternatively, IRV could have been used in the first round in narrowing the field, thereby ensuring that the two finalists were more representative choices for the final runoff election.

As it is, this election could set a precedent for weak democratic procedures going forward. Even more detrimental, a lack of reform could cause the public to lose faith in a democratic system altogether. It's at least possible, however, that public dissent over the polarizing outcome will trigger election reform for future elections.

If nothing else, the Egyptian runoff illustrates that rules of the game matter. If electoral reform does prevail, Egypt could become a global paragon for democratic governance--a testament to IRV's tangible benefits and to the malleability of election rules.

Kenya Visit Shows Youth Vote Key in Next Presidential Election

Tue, 24 Apr 2012 13:02:33 -0700

Railroad tracks cut through Kibera (Photo by Danya Hansberger)

Last month I travelled to Kenya for an alternative spring break with a group of fellow American University students. The focus of our trip was learning about youth civic engagement in preparation for the upcoming Kenyan presidential election - the Kenyan Electoral Commission recently set the date of the election for March of 2013.

This presidential election marks the first in Kenya since 2007. In that election Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner, with 46% of the vote. This was less than a majority of the vote and there was a clear "spoiler" dynamic splitting the opposition. Riots erupted throughout the country when the election results came into dispute, leaving 1,133 killed, 3,561 injured, and 350,000 displaced. In one town, a church was burned to the ground and all 30 people inside were killed. A child who tried to escape on the arms of her mother was thrown back into the fire by one of the attackers.

Much of the bloodshed that took place in the aftermath of the 2007 election was carried out by Kenyan youth, but it in no way paints an accurate portrait of the young people I met on my trip. The Kenyan youth who I met are all striving to fix a broken political system and create meaningful change in the lives of their peers. Young people may have been responsible for violence following the 2007 election, but it was the campaigns of incumbent Mwai Kibaki and challenger Raila Odinga who instigated the civic unrest. It was another unfortunate example of Kenyan political leaders exploiting the youth. Young people ages 15-34 make up 36% of the population in Kenya but they are underrepresented and largely ignored in politics. Politicians only reach out to the youth for political self-gain and too often the youth are the victims of government corruption.

Sanitation in Kibera is poor as sewage runs through walkways (Photo by Katie Zahm)

Take for instance, a recent government program to put young people back to work. The Kazi Kwa Vijana Program was launched in 2009 with the goal of employing young people to complete public works projects. Before all three stages of the program were completed, a financial management review by the World Bank found that millions of schillings meant to pay young people for their work were instead given to senior officials in government.

This story helps explain why the unemployment rate in Kenya for young people ages 15-34 is 65%. Such corruption severely limits the future potential of a young generation eager to enter the workforce. Despite these problems and the memories of the tragic 2007 post-election violence still fresh in the minds of Kenyans, the country moves forward with a palpable feeling of cautious optimism.

"Politics is like food on the table." That's what Ken Omolloh tells me. He's a young man who lives in Kibera, an informal settlement outside Nairobi where most people live on less than $1 a day. On a sunny afternoon, Ken takes me through a labyrinth of small dirt paths that wind narrowly around shacks of tiny houses made of tin and mud. Bags of trash, in some cases piled higher than the shacks themselves, force you to take your steps carefully. At one point we have to jump out of the way of a garbage train that passes by no more than several feet away from the homes in Kibera.

Ken tells me that politics are ingrained in the culture. He describes a home environment where everyone gathers around the television to watch the evening news report about the latest political happenings. The violence following the 2007 election destroyed Ken's home, and forced him to rebuild from the ground up.

It is estimated that roughly 1 million people live in Kibera (Photo by Dayna Hansberger)

We visit his home- a small, one room structure furnished with a couch and small coffee table, divided down the middle by a sheet of cloth to separate the living room from the bedroom. The walls are so thin you can hear a crying baby from next door. Sixty-percent of the people who live in informal settlements such as Kibera are youths ages 15-34.

Later in the week, my fellow trip members and I attend a meeting with the Kibera community. We watch a PET performance- Participatory Educational Theatre, an expression of community concerns and government problems through interactive theatre.

Performers put on a small performance chronicling a young person's struggle trying to get a job in a government system that encourages corruption and excludes qualified job applicants over those who have connections or pay bribes.

Bribery is built into day-to-day services, expected by government employees just as much as a restaurant waiter or waitress expects a tip. To give you an idea, Transparency International, a non-partisan international watchdog, recently rated Kenya's police force as the most corrupt in Eastern Africa. We even experience the corruption first-hand when our driver has to pay a construction worker a bribe to let us pass. It is one of the biggest hurdles holding young people back from advancing in society.

What's impressive is that for all the obstacles young people face, they are just as determined to make things better. The Initiative for Community Action (ICA), a non-governmental organization in Kibera works to empower youth through a variety of programs. Ken is the Finance Director for ICA and he is determined not to have a repeat of the rioting that took place in the aftermath of the 2007 election.

Since the organization was founded in 2003 as a soccer program for young people, it has expanded into a larger operation of providing youth mentorship for young girls, financial literacy trainings for aspiring young entrepreneurs, and computer skills trainings for those seeking work. "Many people think nothing good can come from Kibera," Steve Omondi, an administrator at ICA recently told The Star. "By involving the community through motivational talks, confidence-building through pageant shows, talent search and showcasing successes stories we instill the right attitude in the locals who start viewing life with lots of possibilities," he says.

American University students at ICA (Photo by Dayna Hansberger)

A visit to the organization's tiny office in the heart of Kibera shows the amazing work ICA is doing, despite their lack of resources. My colleagues and I are herded into a small reception area where we sit shoulder to shoulder and speak with ICA's leaders. Each of them, from Ken to Steve, are volunteers who have to work other jobs to maintain their living.

Ken points to a bank of four desktop computers and explains how many youth in Kibera lack basic computer skills necessary to get a job. He also explains how one of the biggest problems the organization faces is finding land for a permanent location. Kibera is all temporary housing, and because of government regulations nothing permanent can be constructed. This puts ICA and other organizations in Kibera at a severe disadvantage.

The presidential election in Kenya next year may mark a turning point. Not only is it the first election since the 2007 post-election violence, it is the first election since Kenya's new Constitution was ratified in 2010. The election promises to be a referendum of sorts on the success of the new constitution.

Certainly, doubts remain. A constitutional convention decided to keep winner-take-all elections for nearly all seats instead of moving to proportional representation, ignoring the evidence of how winner-take-all can exacerbate regional and tribal polarization and distort outcomes. The one exception is the product of an important development: 80 out of 290 seats will be reserved for women, with proportional representation used to elect those seats.

Chart showing the government under the new consitution (Photo by Tyler Sadonis)

Already, we have seen issues arise from the awkward transition a country faces when changing constitutions. For the past several months, there was much uncertainty as to the date of the presidential election. According to the new constitution, the election would take place this August, but the old constitution set the date for whenever the president and prime minister dissolve parliament. Competing opinions over whether to follow the old constitution or the new constitution left much uncertainty as to the date of the election. Adding to the confusion was a court ruling which stated that the election could take place in January 2013, which is when the parliamentary term ends.

Kenya is a country of many dynamics. The country is still a relatively new democracy. Kenya gained independence from Great Britain in 1963 and first started having multi-party elections in 1992. Corruption, economic inequality, and tribalism drive the nation's politics, though the country is making progress in reforming these practices.

As Kenya moves forward, it will be fascinating to see what role the youth play in the elections. This large segment of the population seeks to take the lead in deciding which direction the country will go. Each of my conversations with the Kenyan youth I met reveal that they have ambitions to start businesses, seek careers in medicine and law, and find opportunities to serve their fellow citizens. As the 2013 presidential election approaches, we may well see more young people voting and creating the change Kenya so desperately needs.

Egypt and the Winner-Take-All Distortion

Thu, 08 Mar 2012 10:15:16 -0800

With 80 million inhabitants, Egypt is the largest country in the Arab world and is of great importance strategically and geopolitically. Although the Arab Spring movement started in neighboring Tunisia, its spread to Egypt greatly increased attention to this unpredented popular movement. The subsequent 2011 revolution that resulted in the ouster of strongman Hosni Mubarak after decades of rule, is a major event in modern history.

There is still much work to be done and great sacrifice still lies ahead, but Egyptians have a historic opportunity to finally realize their democratic aspirations and to cast off the authoritarian tradition that has squandered a nation’s collective potential for decades. Transitions to democracy can be complicated, however, and Egypt’s transition is particularly fragile. The role of its electoral system is particularly important.

In a previous post, we explored the hybrid election system by which Egyptians recently selected deputies to the new People’s Assembly, noting the way in which some deputies were elected using a proportional representation system and others by winner-take-all. In this new post, we analyze the consequences of this framework and examine how these voting rules affected representation within the legislature.

The key lesson is clear: use of proportional representation for half of the parliamentary seats was essential for ensuring a representative outcome. If only American-style, winner-take-all elections had been used, one party would have won almost two-thirds of seats despite earning barely a third of the vote, an outcome that would have been highly destabilizing for a fragile democracy in which political groups fear and mistrust one another. Furthermore, without proportional representation, it is possible that both women and secular parties would have been completely shut out of representation.

Party or Alliance	Share PR Vote	Share PR Seats	Share WTA Seats	PR Seats vs. Vote	WTA Seats vs. Vote
Democratic Alliance (Freedom and Justice) Muslim Brotherhood	37.5%	38.3%	65.1%	+ 0.8	+ 27.6
Islamist Bloc (Al-Nour) Salafi Islamist	27.8%	28.9%	16.3%	+ 1.1	- 11.6
New Wafd National Liberal	9.2%	10.8%	1.2%	+ 1.7	- 8.0
Egyptian Bloc Social Liberal	8.9%	9.9%	1.2%	+ 1.1	- 7.7
Al-Wasat Moderate Islamist	3.7%	3.0%	0.0%	- 0.6	- 3.7
Reform and Development Liberal	2.2%	2.4%	0.6%	+ 0.2	- 1.6
Revolution Continues Leftist	2.8%	2.1%	0.0%	- 0.6	- 2.8
Other	8.0%	4.5%	2.4%	- 3.5	- 5.6
Independent/Unaffiliated	-	-	13.3%	-	+ 13.3
Totals	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0	0.0

The Winner Take All Distortion for Political Parties

The table above dramatically shows the distortion in the winner-take-all seats. It lists the major electoral alliances and parties that contested the parliamentary election, showing the share of seats each group earned under proportionality and winner-take-all.

For instance, the FJP-anchored Democratic Alliance, which won 235 of the legislature’s 498 seats, secured 38.3% of the 332 seats apportioned using party list (PR) and 65.1% of the 166 seats distributed via winner-take-all. In the second column, we report each group’s approximate vote shares for the party list (PR) elections, which is a reliable indicator of the general preferences of the electorate.

A truly democratic system should provide reflective representation in the national legislature that adheres as closely as possible to the expressed wishes of voters. It is therefore informative to compare each political alliance or party’s share of the PR vote to its share of seats obtained under each electoral configuration, by subtracting the former from the latter (as seen in the final two columns). Positive numbers, then, indicate inflation in a party’s representation, while negative numbers show the opposite. The closer this differential is to zero, the more reflective the representation.

As a system of seat distribution, the party list (PR) framework adhered closely to the electorate’s preferences. Returning to the Democratic Alliance, we see that its share of PR seats was just 0.8 above its share of the PR vote, a differential very close to zero that indicates rather reflective representation. Other prominent groups, such as the Al-Nour-led Islamist Bloc, also sported positive differentials close to zero. Rules establishing a 0.5% vote threshold for representation and the highest remainder method of allotting unallocated seats, which naturally disadvantage small parties, account for the small distortion we see.

Turning to seats obtained via winner-take-all, we see severe distortion of voter intent. The Democratic Alliance’s share of winner-take-all seats was a staggering 27.6 above its share of the PR vote, a differential indicating highly unreflective representation – winner-take-all magnified its barely one-third share of voter preference to nearly two-thirds of seats. This overrepresentation of the Democratic Alliance led to the underrepresentation of every other party, most notably the Al-Nour bloc and New Wafd. From the perspective of democracy, winner-take-all’s lack of correlation with the preferences of the people is—to say the least—problematic. The question, then, is why winner-take-all produced such distortion.

In a multi-candidate field under winner-take-all, voters who select a losing candidate receive no representation. In Egypt, each winner-take-all district election featured two seats, at least one of which had to go to a candidate classified as a farmer or worker. To win a seat, a candidate needed to win 50% + 1 vote in the first round. Unallocated seats were then decided in a runoff between top candidates. If a voter’s two preferred candidates lost in the first round, failed to be promoted to the second round (either because of low vote totals or occupational status), or lost in the runoff, he or she received no representation. Thus, winner-take-all seat distributions can be very different from shares of the vote.

One value some see in the winner-take-all seats is that they opened the Assembly’s doors for independent candidates who were not able to run for proportional representation seats reserved for candidates belonging to a party. But it was a potentially destabilizing tradeoff – one that could be avoided in the future by exploring such candidate-based alternatives to winner-take-all elections as cumulative voting, single nontransferable vote, and choice voting. Another alternative could be a German-style mixed member seat where the districts outcomes are factored into how many proportional representation seats are elected, with overall party representation ultimately reflecting the party vote.

Winner-Take-All Distortions: Religions and Gender

The Egyptian election was especially distinguished by the Islamist parties’ overwhelming victory, which won a collective landslide majority of seats. While preferences for Islamists was high, the winner-take-all system greatly exaggerated them. For example, the secular parties won 12% of the proportional representation seats, but only 2.4% of the winner-take-all seats, while Islamist parties won 65% of the PR seats and 80% of the winner-take-all seats.

As to the representation of women, out of a total of 508 Members of Parliament, there are only twelve women (2.3%): three who were appointed by the military (the SCAF) and nine who were elected under their party leadership thanks to the proportional representation voting system. (the Egyptian Constitution required the parties to have at least one female candidate on their lists, but their position within was not specified). Not a single woman was elected under winner-take-all.

This contrasts sharply with women’s electoral success in Tunisia, which held elections for representatives to the Constituent Assembly in October 2011. There, women make up 23% of elected legislators. In Ennahdha, Tunisia’s most prominent Islamist party, 44% of its representatives are women. Tunisian electoral law, which requires parties to alternate between male and female candidates, partly explains this phenomenon. In contrast, Egypt’s election law did not specify where women must appear on a party list, not to mention its use of winner-take-all for some seats.

Looking forward

Distortions between voter preferences and seats have potentially major consequences for policy, as representation translates roughly into political power. In that it fails to adhere to voter preferences, winner-take-all rules lead to power concentrations among alliances or parties in ways that fly in the face of core democratic principles. The Democracy Alliance holds 47.2% of all seats despite only 37.5% of voters expressing a preference for the bloc—all due to winner-take-all. International observers wary of the Muslim Brotherhood and its near majority influence in the People’s Assembly, then, should look with concern upon reforms designed to increase—rather than diminish—the proportion of seats obtained via this method.

For a nation long accustomed to authoritarianism, Egypt’s parliamentary elections were an historic democratic enterprise. Relative to the days of Mubarak, representation has become both more nuanced and reflective of the population’s general preferences. However, as we have shown in this piece, the winner-take-all component of Egypt’s hybrid electoral framework creates severe distortions in legislative representation and commensurate political power. Egyptians still have yet to achieve a People’s Assembly that reflects their interests – and the direction of future elections (toward more proportionality or less) will likely indicate how truly democratic the nation has become.

Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, Part 1: The Rules

Mon, 13 Feb 2012 10:12:33 -0800

Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, Part 1: The Rules

Since former President Hosni Mubarak’s departure, a military junta led by Marshal Tantawi has overseen the Egypt. It has promised to transfer power to civilian authorities as soon as an assembly, a government, and a president are elected.

On January 25, 2012, almost a year to the day after the outbreak of “the Tahrir Square revolution” in Cairo, Egyptians celebrated their most democratically elected parliament in their history ; after elections occurring over several phases from late November 2011 to January 2012.

This is the first in a series of three blogposts in which we explore Egypt’s transition to democracy. This post outlines the electoral methods by which Egyptians elected Members to the new Peoples’ Assembly, explaining how some seats were elected using a proportional voting system and others via winner-take-all. In the second post, we will examine more closely the election results of select districts and how voting procedures affected the outcomes. Finally, we will conclude this series by looking at the landslide victory of the Islamist parties, discussing its implications for the future.

* * *

Following the ouster of Mubarak, leaders of the protest movement and military leaders sought to establish rules for free and fair elections, with the military government largely in control of the process. As such, the Supreme Council of the Arms Forces amended the constitution in September of last year, enacting a number of important changes.

As a first step, the amendment altered the methods by which deputies are selected, replacing the discredited framework of the Mubarak era with a “hybrid” of proportional allocation and winner-take-all. Finally, the amendment established specific requirements for the final composition of the People’s Assembly, stipulating that at least half of the chamber’s deputies must be either “workers or farmers,” as opposed to “professionals.” Left unchanged, however, was the presence of ten unelected, appointed deputies, a privilege—previously held by Mubarak—that the Supreme Council kept for itself. As such, only 498 of 508 deputies are elected.

Deputies Elected Using Proportional Allocation

Under the new rules, two-thirds of the Peoples’ Assembly, or 332 seats, were elected using party lists paired with proportional allocation. These seats, furthermore, were divided among 46 districts, which, depending on their size, selected anywhere from four to twelve deputies. Within a given district, each party composed an ordered list containing the names of its candidates, with the constitution having required each list to alternate between a “professional” candidate and a “worker or farmer” in order to ensure diversity—a party could, however, choose with which “type” to begin its list. Finally, a party’s list needed to contain at least one woman—whether “professional” or “worker/farmer.”

The number of seats in a district also determined the percentage of the vote necessary to win a seat—called a “threshold,” found by dividing 100% by the number of seats. For example, in an eight-seat district, the threshold for one seat would have been 12.5% +1 vote, for two seats 25.0% +1 vote, for three seats 37.5% +1 vote, and so on. Parties, then, won a number of seats based on their share of the vote. Each party followed its previously determined list to award seats; candidates toward the top of the list had a greater likelihood of being elected, whereas those on the bottom faced longer odds.

Often, seats in a district remained after the initial round of threshold-based allocation. Any extra seats are distributed using the highest remainder method, in which the first unallocated seat went to the party with greatest “unused” share of the vote, the second seat to the next greatest “unused” share, and so forth. Consider the following hypothetical example below:

Party	Share of Vote	Seats Won With Threshold	Share Vote “Used”	Share of Vote “Unused”	Seats Won with Remainder	Total Seats Won	Vote Exhausted?
A	43.5%	3	37.5%	6.0%	1	4	Yes
B	22.0%	1	12.5%	9.5%	1	2	Yes
C	17.5%	1	12.5%	5.0%	0	1	Yes
D	8.5%	0	0.0%	8.5%	1	1	Yes
E	5.0%	0	0.0%	5.0%	0	0	No (5.0%)
F	3.5%	0	0.0%	3.5%	0	0	No (3.5%)
Totals	100.0%	5	62.5%	37.5%	3	8	91.5%

As can be seen in the table above, five of the district’s eight seats were allocated using the threshold, leaving three seats to divide amongst the parties via highest remainder. With the greatest “unused” vote share, 9.5%, Party B won the first seat, exhausting its entire vote. Next came Party C, the 8.5% of which earned it the second extra seat, while Party A picked up the final seat with 6.0%.

Deputies Elected Using Winner-Take-All Runoff

Under the new rules, one-third of the Peoples’ Assembly, or 166 seats, were elected using winner-take-all combined with a runoff system (if necessary)—this method was intended for independent candidates. These seats, furthermore, were divided among 83 constituencies, each electing two deputies. The constitution required that each constituency send at least one “worker/framer” to the Peoples’ Assembly; the rules proscribed the election of two “professionals.” Each voter had two votes. To win a seat, a candidate needed to receive 50.0% +1 vote of valid ballots. If two candidates received a majority of the vote, then the election was complete—provided at least one was a “worker/farmer.”

Importantly, after this vote, one or more seats could have remained unallocated, and for a number of reasons. Perhaps no candidate won an outright majority; perhaps only one candidate did; or, perhaps two “professionals” earned 50.0% +1 vote, when the constitution allowed only one to become a deputy. Regardless, the election (if necessary) transitioned into a second round, held later. Depending on what transpired in the first round, in the runoff, a number of scenarios could have occurred:

• If two seats remained unfilled after the first round, the runoff for two seats included the top four candidates from before, at least two of which needed to be “workers/farmers.” One of the winners was required to be a “worker/farmer.”
• If one seat remained unfilled and the first round winner was a “professional,” the runoff for one seat included the top two “worker/farmer” candidates from the first round; “professionals” could not run.
• If one seat remained unfilled and the first round winner was a “worker/farmer,” the runoff for one seat included the top two candidates—irrespective of “type”—from before.

In the next edition of this series, we will look at how this system—a “hybrid” of proportionality and winner-take-all—affected the outcomes in certain districts and constituencies.

Sheahan Virgin also contibuted to this blog