FairVote Feed: Research & Analysis

U.S. House Elections as They Are and Will Be

Sun, 22 Jul 2012 21:02:37 -0700

FairVote has released two new reports about congressional elections and an interactive map summarizing their findings. Monopoly Politics 2012 provides the partisan landscape for all 435 U.S. House districts, with data on recent elections, election projections and how redistricting affected partisan outcomes and racial fairness. Fair Voting 2012 shows how American forms of proportional representation could work in every state with more than one House district.

Our reports come with insightful analysis about partisan outcomes, competitiveness, southern politics and more.

FairVotingUS.Com: FairVote's interactive map that presents reports
Fair Voting 2012: State profiles and analysis about fair voting plans
Monopoly Politics 2012: State profiles and analysis about 2012 House elections
Dedication of reports to William Raspberry and Lindsey Needham

Look to Election Rules to Reverse Decline of Political Center

Fri, 11 May 2012 08:34:20 -0700

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME)

Despite having one of the Senate’s more conservative voting records, Dick Lugar (R-IN) has not been a partisan ideologue. His landslide primary defeat to Tea Party-backed challenger Richard Mourdock is the latest sign that reaching across the aisle to build bipartisan policy has become a recipe for a shortened political career.

After a campaign in which Mourdock charged that Lugar was “President Obama’s favorite Republican,” Lugar defended “constructive compromise” and warned that “unrelenting” partisanship would paralyze American government. His remarks mirrored those of Olympia Snowe (R-ME) when she announced her retirement this spring. Snowe lamented that her approach to governance no longer fit an institution in which partisans “block the other side” and demand reflexive fealty to party.

Snowe called on Americans to see “strength in compromise, courage in conciliation, and honor in consensus-building.” But moderates are far more apt to be pilloried and purged than prized and protected. Lugar and Snowe are only the latest in a string of victims of a “do-not-compromise” stance that has been reinforced within both major parties by every new hardliner victory. Ben Nelson (D-NE), Joe Lieberman (D/I-CT), George Voinovich (R-OH), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Lincoln Chafee (R/I-RI), Arlen Specter (R/D-PA), and Bob Bennett (R-UT) are among high-profile senators whose history of bipartisanship led to retirement or lost reelection bids. The ranks of moderates in the House have been similarly depleted.

The decline of the middle in the Senate is especially significant given that its rules make one-party rule almost impossible. Because the Senate needs 60 votes to break a filibuster, moderates can assist the majority by voting for cloture or side against the majority until it tempers its proposals. They often inject restraint into a dialogue often soured by venomous rhetoric.

Yet as the divide between the parties has widened and solidified, moderates today face pressure to conform or retire. Those remaining face a dual threat: stronger challenges to holding onto their party’s nomination and uphill general elections in the “opposition territory” they disproportionately represent. It’s no accident that 2012’s most vulnerable Senate incumbents—Scott Brown (R-MA), Jon Tester (D-MT), and Claire McCaskill (D-MO)—all represent states that their presidential nominee will likely lose. Overcoming that partisan challenge has become harder in every passing election.

Sen. Snowe has rightly faulted the “corrosive trend of winner-take-all politics,” in which winning parties fail to forge bipartisan solutions. But we must go further to understand this behavior. Winner-take-all politics is grounded in winner-take-all voting, in which a plurality of votes earns 100% of representation. We have had those rules for a long time, but not with modern consultants armed with new polling methods, modern technologies, and near-limitless funds. In mastering how to win the game, we have destroyed its ability to produce effective representative government.

While not as enthralling as the battle for power and clash of values that dominate political coverage, election rules matter—they condition ballot tabulation, voter behavior, and campaign strategy. Winner-take-all influences the composition of government—who’s in it and who’s not, as well as how they get there. If Americans are dissatisfied with the latter, they must examine the former.

Winner-take-all rules today simply cannot represent fairly the left, right, and center. In a two-party system, the gain of one side is undeniably the other’s loss when third parties and independents are dismissed as mere “spoilers” rather than viable alternatives. Vilifying one’s opponent leaves voters with only one viable electoral option: oneself. The apocalyptic rhetoric and black-and-white thinking that pass for political strategy work under winner-take-all.

These tools of negative rhetoric and zero-sum campaigning translate into the habits of governing. With only two viable choices, parties are rewarded electorally for obstruction more than compromise. In turn, partisans seek representatives who will fight more than seek consensus.

Winner-take-all voting incentivizes partisanship, compels centrists to squeeze into restrictive ideological boxes and rewards the “us-versus-them” mentality moderates resist. But it is not part of our Constitution, and our cities and states are already providing a roadmap for change. In Illinois, cumulative voting in three-seat state legislative districts led to shared representation across the state for both parties until 1980, when the legislature was reduced in size and went to one-seat districts. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, the instant runoff form of ranked choice voting rewards candidates who can earn the second choice support of other candidates’ supporters.

Electing representatives interested in compromise and independent thinking in proportion to the share of voters who support them will require structural election change. Pleading with voters to support centrist politicians is not sufficient when the institutional framework of American elections and government discourages and penalizes such behavior. Rather than just criticize Congress as broken, let’s act to fix it.

Primaries Spotlight Sharp Decline in U.S. House Moderates

Tue, 08 May 2012 13:41:02 -0700

Left to right: Tim Holden and Jason Altmire

Pennsylvania’s April 24 primary lacked the anticipated fireworks between Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum in the Republican presidential race, but results on the Democratic side may have a far more lasting impact: they underscore the disappearing center in American politics. Two Blue Dog Democrats*, Jason Altmire and Tim Holden, were defeated by more mainstream Democrats. After 20 years of victories in Republican-leaning districts, Holden fell to newcomer Matt Cartwright in a district drawn to be much more Democratic, while Altmire was upset by his colleague Rep. Mark Critz† in a race that, because of redistricting, featured two incumbents battling over one seat.

Both Cartwright and Critz received strong support from unions and other progressive groups, which sought to defeat Holden and Altmire because of their opposition to President Obama’s health care and climate change legislation. In other words, the party’s base organized against Holden and Altmire because their voting records were not sufficiently orthodox. While the Tea Party’s targeting of moderate Republicans in 2010 and 2012 has received the most media attention, the Pennsylvania results indicate a similar (and arguably just as strong) tendency in the Democratic Party.

Indeed, the Democrats’ Blue Dog caucus—a barometer of moderate strength—had its numbers reduced by more than half, from 54 to 26, in the 2010 election, in which Republicans made most of their gains in the Republican-leaning districts that wee disproportionately represented by Blue Dogs. The Washington Post reports that primary defeats and retirements are expected to reduce the caucus by at least eight more members by next year.

Although it is no surprise that a party’s most fervent supporters would desire “faithful” representatives ready to stand up for their core principles, the decline of moderates in Congress is worrisome, with Senate moderates also under attack. Although a minority in both major parties, moderate voters exist in large numbers that deserve representation. Furthermore, the political center is necessary to the health of a democratic system, especially one like ours grounded in checks and balances across branches of government.

Moderates, for instance, can serve as bridges between the two parties, swinging to the majority or away from it in order to develop policy that is more temperate. They also inject civility into a poisonous discourse. But we are in a vicious cycle: the decline of moderates causes each party to become more polarized and isolated, which in turn, only further accelerates the decline of moderates. With the center under attack, moderates face pressure to conform or perish.

Whatever one may think of Holden and Altmire, it is critical for a political system to reflect the wide range of viewpoints; such is the essence of a democratic system. Yet, our current election framework disadvantages moderate candidates and the voters that back them. As manipulated by modern campaign consultants, winner-take-all rules (in which a plurality of votes wins 100% of representation) encourage partisanship, zero-sum thinking, apocalyptic rhetoric, and negative campaigning—since only one side can win in a given congressional district.

As such, winner-take-all creates a political environment inhospitable to compromise, as it forces centrist politicians to fit themselves into narrow ideological boxes. Clearly, we need rules in place that reflect nuances and partisan gradations, rather than the “two-sizes-fit-all” mentality of winner-take-all. The most natural alterative to winner-take-all elections at the U.S. House level is proportional representation, a system in which like-minded voters can elect candidates in proportion to their share of the overall vote.

FairVote advocates for candidate-based, American forms of proportional representation, what we call “fair voting,” in which voters would elect several representatives in larger “super districts” with voting methods in which 51% of votes wins most seats, but not all. The key is that fair voting plans lower the threshold of votes necessary to win a seat and create opportunities for an array of opinions to be represented within a given super-district. This contrasts sharply with winner-take-all, in which the candidate with the most votes wins and his or her voters receive representation while everyone else gets nothing.

By fairly representing the left, right, and center in any given super district, fair voting would liberate moderate candidates from pressures to conform. With the threshold lowered, moderates could focus on targeted appeals to their core constituency, including a mix of centrist independents and more partisan voters. Both Holden and Altmire were targeted by a Democratic base that demanded fealty to party. It is not terribly difficult to imagine the way in which proportionality could have freed them from these pressures—and given voters in these districts a centrist alternative to the traditional partisan-Democrat-versus-partisan-Republican race set for November.

Fair voting would also weaken the power of partisan redistricting. Winner-take-all makes gerrymandering a particularly potent tool; without those underlying “if-you-win-I-lose, if-I-win-you-lose” rules in place, its power is diminished. Both Holden and Altmire faced difficult roads to reelection, in part, because of redistricting. Pennsylvania Republicans controlled redistricting and packed more Democrats into Holden’s district in order to help Republicans in adjoining districts—thereby making the district less hospitable to Holden’s unique brand of moderation and exposing him to a primary challenge. Altmire, meanwhile, was paired in a district with fellow incumbent Critz. Under fair voting, the Republican’s strategic cartography would have been without purpose and Holden, Altmire, and their opponents all would have a chance to win seats. Fair voting allows such shared representation.

It is time for structural election change. Election rules greatly impact the composition of government—who is in it and who is not, as well as how they get there. If Americans are dissatisfied with the latter—and polls consistently indicate they are—then they must examine the former. Clearly winner-take-all amplifies partisanship and polarization in Congress; it is therefore antagonistic toward the goal of achieving a more collaborative and collegial legislature. Blue Dog Democrats like Holden and Altmire are struggling to survive, while most moderate Republicans were long ago pushed out of Congress. To ensure fair representation in Congress, we must act before all bridges between the parties in Congress have been burned.

* The National Journal’s vote rankings of members of Congress places Altmire (187) and Holden (186) as the fourth and fifth most conservative of the 190 Democrats in the U.S. House; only representatives Dan Boren (OK-2), Mike Ross (AR-4), and Jim Matheson (UT-2) posted records that were more moderate. Both Boren and Ross have decided not to seek reelection in 2012.

† Relative to Altmire, Critz is more liberal. The National Journal’s vote rankings of members of Congress places Critz (169) as the 22nd most conservative Democrat in the U.S. House. While this would arguably place Critz among the party’s Blue Dogs, he is not a member of the Blue Dog caucus.

Snowe-ball Effect: How the Loss of Yet another Congressional Moderate Makes the Case for Election Reform

Tue, 24 Apr 2012 14:30:27 -0700

The Senate’s Moderates under Assault as Polarization and Partisanship Increase

Admonishing the U.S. Senate for “dysfunction and political polarization,” Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), who throughout her career often received praise for eschewing party orthodoxy and embracing bipartisanship, announced on March 1 that she would not stand for a fourth term. In explaining her decision, Snowe wrote that her unique brand of moderation no longer fit an institution in which ideologues, laboring to “block the other side” and demanding reflexive fealty to party, ruled the roost.

In her statement, Snowe reiterated the importance of bipartisanship. “There is not only strength in compromise, courage in conciliation and honor in consensus-building,” she insisted, “but also a political reward for following these tenets.” Or at least, she might have added, there should be. Unfortunately, recent elections and retirements have demonstrated that moderates are more apt to be pilloried and purged than prized and protected. Snowe is simply the latest example in an increasing “no-more-moderates” trend that has only intensified as the ideological gulf between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats in the Senate has widened. Consider the following recent examples:

Sen. Ben Nelson (D, NE) – to retire in 2013; Nelson would have faced a robust 2012 general election challenge in a heavily Republican state
Sen. Joe Lieberman (D, CT) – to retire in 2013; Lieberman—the Democratic Party’s vice presidential nominee in 2000—lost in the 2006 Democratic primary to liberal challenger Ned Lamont, but nevertheless won the general election as an independent
Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D, AR) – defeated in the 2010 general election after barely besting liberal challenger Bill Halter in the Democratic primary
Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R, RI) – defeated in the 2006 general election after barely besting conservative challenger Steve Laffey in the Republican primary; in 2010, Chafee was elected governor as an independent in a fractured three-way race
Sen. Arlen Specter (R/D, PA) – switched parties in 2009 to avoid conservative challenger Pat Toomey in the 2010 Republican primary; Specter nevertheless lost the 2010 Democratic primary to Joe Sestak
Sen. Bob Bennet (R, UT) – despite a conservative track record, Bennett was accused by Utah Republicans of being too moderate; they defeated his 2010 bid for re-election at the state convention
Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R, AK) – lost the 2010 Republican primary to conservative challenger Joe Miller; Murkowski beat the odds, winning the general election as an independent write-in candidate
Rep. Mike Castle (R, DE) – though not an incumbent senator, the long-time House member was considered a lock for the general election, but lost the Republican primary to conservative challenger Christine O’Donnell

Image: New York Times

Whether defeated electorally or departing for retirement, the common theme among these aforementioned moderates is that all faced disillusionment within their own party among the base and, therefore, were susceptible to primary challenges—from the right for Republicans and the left for Democrats. When bases feel energized and confident, as did liberals in 2006 and conservatives in 2010, moderates within their respective party coalition are apt to feel intra-party pressures to embrace party orthodoxy, in order to mollify critics within the party. While some moderates such as Montana’s Max Baucus (D) and Maine’s Susan Collins (R) have been fortunate enough to avoid robust primary challenges, such individuals are the exceptions that seemingly prove the rule.

Nothing highlights the power of a dissatisfied base more than an incumbent moderate who loses the primary despite representing a “safe” state regularly won by their party at the presidential level—Republicans in “red states” (Bennett, Murkowski) and Democrats in “blue states” (Lieberman). For these individuals, victory in the general election was relatively assured—provided they could survive a primary from a base recognizing the party’s nominee could become more orthodox without jeopardizing the “safe” status of the seat.

From Left: Ben Nelson, Joe Lieberman, Blanche Lincoln

The above list also demonstrates that many moderates today face a dual threat: not only difficulty in winning their party’s nomination as the ideological gulf between them and the base widens, but also difficulty in winning the general election. This is particularly the case for individuals hailing from states within “opposition territory”—moderate Republicans in Democratic “blue states” (Snowe, Chafee, Castle) and moderate Democrats in Republican “red states” (Nelson, Lincoln)—in which their party was the minority in federal races. As such, these individuals were vulnerable to not only primary but also general election challenges. Such is in marked contrast to the past, as Senate moderates historically were able win and hold seats in states the other party dominated at the presidential level, including southern Democrats and northeastern Republicans. However, as polarization has increased, such occurrences have become exceedingly rare.

The electoral stage at which a particular moderate stumbled notwithstanding, it is clear that this group of politicians faces recurrent pressure to conform or perish. While Snowe, Nelson, and Lieberman have exited the electoral stage, others have not. Indeed, many of the most vulnerable incumbent Senators in 2012 are moderates who represent “opposition territory” states: Scott Brown (R) in Massachusetts, Jon Tester (D) in Montana, and Claire McCaskill (D) in Missouri. Veteran Republicans Richard Lugar of Indiana and Orrin Hatch of Utah, both accused of being too moderate for their conservative states, face tough primary challenges from the right of their party. As presidential candidate (and moderate) Jon Huntsman quipped this week when discussing his struggles within the GOP, “This is what [a party does] in China on party matters if you talk off script.” While obviously hyperbolic, Huntsman’s quote nevertheless highlights the way in which a party’s demand for ideological homogeneity and desire to speak with one, official voice can potentially trouble a political system.

From Left: Lincoln Chafee, Arlen Specter, Bob Bennett

Yet moderates, whether liberal Republicans or conservative Democrats, are essential to the health of a functioning democracy, especially given Senate filibuster rules that make one-party rule almost impossible. In a closely divided Senate, moderate members can act as swing votes, forcing the majority leadership to temper its proposals as it patches together a winning coalition. In a Senate in which one party has a sizable majority, albeit shy of the 60-vote supermajority required to break the filibuster, moderates can cross the aisle and end the deadlock. Moderates also can inject civility and restraint into a discourse too often soured by animus and venomous rhetoric.

How Election Rules Affect the Political Fortunes of Moderates

Snowe’s retirement immediately whipped the political punditocracy into frenzy. It would be a mistake, however, should Snowe’s clarion call, which warned of a paralyzed legislature, lamented a moribund public discourse, and spoke of the need for reform, be lost in the resulting tumult. It is essential for Americans not only to grapple with the question of why our polity has mutated into a creature so disquieting, but also to strike at the root of the cause. That root, as Snowe adroitly noted, is the “corrosive trend of winner-take-all politics,” to which she attributes the prevalence of zero-sum tactics and “brinkmanship” in Congress.

Winner-take-all politics, in turn, are linked inexorably to winner-take-all election rules, in which a plurality of the vote wins 100% of representation; voters who select the losing party receive nothing, no matter the margin of defeat. And the rules of a voting system, while perhaps not as enthralling as the battle for power and the clash of values that dominate political coverage, matter—they condition ballot tabulation, influence voter behavior, and affect campaign strategy. “Electoral laws are of special importance for every group and individual in society,” political scientist Douglas Rae noted in 1967, “because they help to decide who writes the other laws.” In other words, winner-take-all rules greatly impact the composition of government—who is in it and who is not, as well as how they get there. If Americans are dissatisfied with the latter—and polls consistently indicate they are—then they must examine the former.

From Left: Lisa Murkowski, Mike Castle, Claire McCaskill

It is astonishing, as one begins to investigate critically our system, how archaic, broken, undemocratic, and destructive our rules are. While many Americans share Snowe’s concerns over political polarization and the seeming inability of partisans to place aside their differences for the public good, they have failed largely to recognize the contribution of winner-take-all rules. After all, under a framework in which the gain of one party is undeniably the loss of the other, it is understandable—though not desirable—that leaders in the political minority might begrudge collaboration with the majority, if such means handing the latter an accomplishment upon which it may run in the next election. It is no surprise, then, that each party defines itself in singular opposition to the other; winner-take-all encourages this behavior.

Many Americans are tired also of negative campaigns, spooky advertisements, and the regularity with which one side brazenly accuses the other of toiling for the ruin of the country, but, again, fail to examine the culpability of winner-take-all rules. After all, in a two-party system permitting just one winner, if negative advertising can devastate or disqualify a competitor, a candidate for elected office need only vilify her opponent to leave voters with just one remaining viable option: the major party that ran the attack (that, or not to vote). Simply put, the apocalyptic rhetoric and black-and-white thinking that pass for political discussion today work under winner-take-all. If you see the world in shades of gray, too bad—recognizing the humanity of the other party and occasionally teaming with it is no way to win votes.

From Left: Scott Brown, Jon Tester, Richard Lugar

An Alternative Electoral Framework that Could Advantage Moderates

The most natural alterative to winner-take-all is proportional representation (of which there are many forms), a voting system that allocates seats to parties in proportion to their share of the vote. For a while, Illinois employed a "semi-proportional” system, called cumulative voting, for elections to the state legislature; districts featured three seats each. Under this arrangement, each third of the electorate—left, right, and center—typically won a seat. Such meant that most representatives shared constituents with colleagues from other parties. The result was that moderates and independent-minded legislators had the ability and the incentives to forge bipartisan solutions.

While proportionality is feasible for elections to the U.S. House, such a framework, however, is not applicable for senatorial and gubernatorial contests that must feature, by definition, one winner. While no election system is a panacea, there is a lot to like about ranked choice voting (RCV, also called instant runoff voting), an alternative framework—used recently for mayoral elections in Portland, Maine, and San Francisco, California—that would allow voters to rank candidates in order of preference.

RCV consists of a series of rounds, in which last place finishers are eliminated and their voters redistributed to remaining candidates based on second choices. This process continues, round by round, until a candidate receives a majority of continuing ballots. RCV’s requirement of a majority, rather than a plurality, to win office is very important, because a candidate—unless he or she commands over fifty percent of first choices—must build a majority coalition, which means bidding for the supporters of eliminated candidates. Whereas winner-take-all highlights partisan divisions, RCV creates incentives for candidates to emphasize points of concurrence.

Such a system advantages moderate candidates—provided they have genuine support—in a number of ways. First, under RCV, politics is less of a sprint toward the poles of the ideological spectrum. Second, RCV usually sees a decline in negative attack advertisements, the rules encouraging candidates not to slander an adversary—and risk the ire of his voters—but to build bridges and form partnerships. RCV, in that narrow appeals to a niche of base voters is a less sagacious campaign strategy, also encourages ideologues to moderate, in order to appeal to voters outside their partisan bases—ironically, much like their heroes, Franklin Roosevelt for liberals and Ronald Reagan for conservatives.

* * *

Importantly, the habits of campaigning become the habits of governing, the negative rhetoric and zero-sum thinking of the campaign trail become the negative rhetoric and zero-sum thinking of the Senate floor. If we desire a government founded upon compromise and conciliation—as indeed the Senate was designed—then we must fashion an electoral system that selects for candidates possessing such proclivities. Clearly, winner-take-all is antagonistic toward this goal; it not only compels moderates to squeeze themselves into restrictive ideological boxes but also rewards the very “us-versus-them” mentality moderates by definition resist. I suspect Snowe’s retirement will not, unfortunately, have a lasting impact on the political discourse nor will it galvanize Americans to demand structural change. What is clear, however, is that it should. Snowe had the courage of her convictions. It is time for Americans to have the courage of theirs.

The 2012 GOP Nomination Contest Affirms Value of New Rules

Mon, 23 Apr 2012 15:07:10 -0700

Rick Santorum’s decision to suspend his campaign effectively handed the Republican nomination to Mitt Romney. Although several states have yet to vote and Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul remain in the race, Romney is sure to win an easy victory at the Republican convention, absent a major controversy.

Before pundits rush on to talk of the general election and its dwindling number of swing states, however, we should reflect on the nomination contest and the impact of its rules. In 2010, the Republican National Committee (RNC) changed its rules in order to delay the start of voting, to discourage the frontloading of state contests, and to allocate early states’ delegates by proportional representation instead of winner-take-all.

Despite the usual anti-democracy talk of insiders who wished Romney could have eliminated his competition after just a few states had voted, the Republican National Committee’s Rules Committee this week handily rejected proposals to go back to a more compressed schedule full of winner-take-all primaries. As the New York Times reported:

Morton Blackwell, a member from Virginia, also opposed the change. He said that the longer process, made possible by proportional voting, made it possible for more states to consider the candidates. “We have had a full vetting as a result of the rules,” Mr. Blackwell said.

We agree that the new rules are a big improvement over the 2008 rules. But we would encourage Republicans, as well as Democrats, to consider further improvements that will ensure future nomination contests balance the goals of freedom of choice, maximum participation, and success in nominating a representative candidate.

The Republican Journey

Certainly, the 2012 Republican primary was replete with drama—either comedic or tragic, depending on your perspective. It featured a colorful cast of characters, with nearly each one getting his or her moment on the national stage. Yet despite a series of unexpected surges and retreats, the outcome was rarely in serious question. The Coronation of Mitt Romney was less about the outcome than the journey.

Relative to the GOP’s contest in 2008, the 2012 battle for the Republican nomination was a protracted affair that continually oscillated back and forth, with Romney gaining momentum only to see it subsequently fizzle after surges for Santorum or Gingrich. As the race settled into a marathon, Romney embraced delegate math to prove his continued inevitability. Though grassroots Republicans in many states exulted at their chance to weigh in, establishment Republicans fretted over the odds of a brokered convention and a divided party. With the media’s relentless handicapping of the race and all-consuming focus on “who’s up and who’s down,” many overlooked the benefits of a drawn out process: that more voters in more states were getting the chance to cast a meaningful vote in a Republican primary.

There can be little doubt that the meta-narrative of the 2012 Republican primary was the way in which Romney—despite an unrivaled ground operation, a redoubtable financial war chest, the powerful services of an “uncoordinated” Super PAC, the backing of the party establishment, and polls that designated him as the most competitive Republican against Obama—struggled. The question is why—and whether the process did more to rally the party around Romney than would have a quick knockout victory. As we turn to the general election, the answer to this question could be very important.

Competing Theories: Romney was Weakened by Proportional Rules or by Being Romney

The Inside-the-Beltway explanation of Romney’s troubles insists that the RNC’s embrace of more proportional allocation of delegates for early contests undermined Romney. As such, the 2012 GOP primary was longer than usual because new rules allowed Romney’s opponents to earn delegates in states that, before, would have gone as a winner-take-all unit to the victor. Proponents of this theory made up for their lack of rigor in looking at real numbers with emphatic opinion.

The alternative explanation focuses on Romney himself—in part his tendency for gaffs and being workmanlike more than inspirational, but more fundamentally the question of whether his faith (as a Mormon) and New England brand of Republicanism were too much to inspire some conservatives to back him this spring and work hard for him in the fall. In particular, Romney faced challenges due to a history of more socially moderate positions and his leadership in enacting a state-based version of President Obama’s health care plan.

As such, the 2012 GOP nomination contest was longer than usual because the overwhelming favorite had trouble connecting with the party base. According to Gallup, the percentage of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents saying they would “vote enthusiastically” for Romney (35%) trails numbers from 2008 for McCain among Republicans (47%) and Obama among Democrats (54%). FairVote analysis found that, with all his advantages, “Romney 2012” struggled repeatedly to match the vote shares “Romney 2008” had posted four years ago, besting his old self in barely half (just 10 of 19) of states. The Washington Post’s Dan Balz fingered one particularly revealing statistic: in every primary or caucus with an exit poll, Romney lost when more than half of respondents were white evangelical Christians and won when fewer than half of respondents were white evangelical Christians.

When examining the data, the argument that the RNC’s new proportional rules harmed Romney crumbles. First, FairVote’s analysis shows that the effect of proportional delegate allocation on Romney’s totals was a wash; Romney shed nearly as many delegates to his challengers in states he won as he gained from states he lost†. Indeed his actual share of delegates (52%) is far closer to what would have happened with the same vote totals and pure winner-take-all (53%) than with pure proportionality (39%), primarily due to “quirks” in state rules caused by the RNC’s “loose definition” of what constitutes proportional allocation.

The evidence instead suggests that Romney’s struggles resulted from his inability to connect with Republican voters. Public opinion polls during the nomination contest often showed a majority of Republican voters were dissatisfied with their party’s candidates. But by proving his mettle, winning key states, and adjusting his rhetoric, Romney seems to have earned far more respect and support among Republicans.

The latest polls now show a majority of Republicans now welcomes Romney as the nomine, and several polls of the general election contest, including a New York Times poll, show him even with Barack Obama and a Gallup poll showing 90% of Republicans say they will back him. Although some pundits still grumble that having to work hard for the nomination has tarnished his candidacy and increased his negatives by forcing him to highlight more conservative positions, it’s clear that Romney has become a more representative Republican nominee—and that he may win in November.

How to Make the Nomination Process Better

Looking forward, we would suggest a few simple changes to the rules, based on this year’s contest—not necessarily our ideal plan, but one that we could see Republicans and Democrats adopting in 2016:

Make it clear that any state violating the proposed schedule in 2016 will lose all its delegates: This change is almost certainly the only way to stop Florida from again violating the party’s plan to have the first states vote in February.
Enforce stricter proportionality in contests held before April 1: Too many states like Florida used winner-take-all in early contests despite the 2010 rules, and many states that used proportionality employed mixed, quirky forms that still created substantial distortions in voter preferences. (Note that the Democrats wisely use proportional representaiton for all presidential nomination contests.)
Adopt ranked choice ballots to handle fractured votes: Due to the media’s obsession with “winning,” we should allow voters to cast ranked choice ballots, which would allow us to determine which of the vote-leaders would have won if matched one-on-one against his or her top opponent.
Adopt ranked choice ballots to handle overseas voters: Ranked choice ballots at least should be cast by overseas voters so they don’t end up having their ballots count for a candidate who has dropped out since mailing in their ballot.

Be sure to stay with FairVote as the general election between Mitt Romney and President Obama heats up. If you missed our unique analysis of the 2012 GOP nomination battle, you can find links to pertinent materials below:

GOP 2012 Primary Race Results: Resource compares each candidate’s share of the popular vote to his or her share of RNC delegates, state-by-state
Romney 2012 vs. Romney 2008: Resource explores how this year’s Romney performed relative to his 2008 self; in most states, Romney 2012 struggled to match Romney 2008
Paul 2012 vs. Paul 2008: Resource explores how this year’s Ron Paul performed relative to his 2008 self; in the vast majority of states, Paul 2012 bested Paul 2008
Romney Delegate Total Nearly Matches Total if All Contests Winner-Take-All: Resource examines the way in which Romney’s delegate total, rather than reflecting pure proportional allocation, was nearly identical to what would have resulted under pure winner-take-all rules
RNC Proportional Rules Not Hurting Romney: Resource rebuts claims by Romney surrogate Chris Christie that the RNC’s proportional allocation of delegates has damaged Romney
The Florida Republican Primary and the Effects of its Rule Breaking: Resource looks at the consequences of Florida’s decision to use winner-take-all for its allocation of delegates
Ranked Choice Voting and the GOP: Resource discusses the way in which RCV could assist the Republican Party in achieving majority consensus over the choice of its nominee
Understanding Proportional Representation in New Hampshire: Resource delves into the proportional rules of the nation’s first primary to make sense of how the new process works
Iowa and New Hampshire’s First in the Nation Status Unfair to Other States: Resource discusses the consequences of having the same two states go first in every presidential election
Understanding How the Iowa Caucuses Work -- and Don’t Work: Resource places the Iowa caucuses in context and clears up existing misconceptions
GOP Primary Rules All Over the Place: Resource details the way in which new RNC rules vary between states, creating confusion for both voters and researchers

† This includes the Missouri primary, a non-binding contest that Rick Santorum won on February 7. The other 12 states are as follows: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

Third Parties and the Spoiler Effect In the 2012 Election

Tue, 28 Feb 2012 10:39:45 -0800

As the 2012 presidential election approaches, it's clear that while many American voters are ready for a third party, America's election system is not.

According to a recent Gallup poll, 52% of Americans, including a majority of independents and for the first time a majority of Republicans, believe America needs a third major party. Fivethirtyeight.com’s election analyst Nate Silver recently detailed reasons to expect a serious third-party run in 2012: low approval for both major parties, lack of strong support for either party's positions on debt and economic issues, and congressional deadlock lowering public opinions about the Inside-the-Beltway establishment. Silver analyzed post-WWII races, finding that ones with similar conditions to 2012 often featured strong third-party activity. Silver's predictions may already be vindicated - between President Obama, the GOP nominee, Virgil Goode (the Constitution Party nominee), Gary Johnson (the likely Libertarian nominee), and an as-yet undecided Americans Elect nominee, we could easily see five current or former governors or Members of Congress on the November ballot - the most in US history.

New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman is among those calling for a third voice in the election, writing in support of a candidate to represent the “radical center” with a focus on economic and fiscal issues. This candidate, Friedman believes, might follow in the footsteps of Ross Perot who, despite losing the election, in 1992 succeeded in making a balanced budget a major issue for Clinton’s presidency. Friedman suggests former comptroller general and current Comeback America Initiative CEO David Walker be a third-party candidate.

Friedman wants Walker in this fall’s debates, but it’s revealing that Friedman ends his glowing discussion of Walker with the caveat that he might not actually vote for his most preferred candidate because of the spoiler effect – as seen in the 2000 election when Ralph Nader drew away voters from Al Gore and the 1992 election when many believe Ross Perot hurt George Bush’s re-election changes. This showcases the current problem with third parties: even if they occasionally affect debates, third parties are not serious contenders in elections even in their strongest years because the spoiler effect scares away potential supporters.

The spoiler effect is one of the most bizarre and undemocratic consequences of our winner-take-all electoral system. For instance, voting for a conservative candidate should not make a liberal candidate more likely to win – but that is exactly what has happened in a series of key U.S. Senate elections where Libertarian Party candidates have earned significantly more votes than the winning margin for Democrats. Liberal Democrats frustrated with relative centrism of Bill Clinton and Al Gore suffered similar unintended consequences for supporting Ralph Nader in 2000.

The spoiler problem is a product of state statutes that allow a candidate to win all of its electoral votes even when falling short of half the popular votes – a rule that meant that in 1992, 49 states awarded all their electoral votes to candidates who won less than 50% of the vote in their states.

One traditional approach is runoff elections, which states could establish even for presidential elections by statute. FairVote’s preferred solution is instant runoff voting (IRV), a ranked choice voting (RCV) system designed to uphold majority rule. With IRV, voters indicate both their first choice and their backup choices by ranking candidates in order of preference. If no candidate earns more than 50% of the vote in the first round, the election count simulates a series of runoffs elections.

If you are a third-party supporter in an IRV election, you can vote for a third-party candidate without losing the chance to help defeat the major party candidate you like the least. For instance, if your third-party candidate loses a round of runoff voting and you selected a major party candidate as your second choice, your ballot will then be added to the total of your preferred major party candidate. Elections across America use IRV, including mayoral elections in San Francisco; St. Paul; Oakland; Telluride; Portland, Maine; and Minneapolis, as well as overseas voters in runoff elections in Arkansas, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Internationally, it’s used to elect the mayor of London, president of Ireland and members of the House of Representatives in Australia.

In the short-term, states can adopt IRV for more elections, including races for U.S. Senate and governor. In 2010, 14 general elections for Senate or governor were won with less than 50% of the vote, underscoring the value of adopting IRV for these elections. In the long-term, the success of IRV in individual states will speak for itself, building momentum for a constitutional amendment combined with a national popular vote for president.

The American hunger for more choices is likely only to increase in the modern era. Presidential elections should never hinge on “spoiler” candidates and aggressive partisanship – they should depend on the will of the people. Instant runoff voting is a critically important step towards helping America’s political process catch up with the rich political diversity of America’s voters.

Blame Game: NJ Governor Chris Christie Wrong to Fault RNC’s Proportional Rules for Romney’s Nomination Travails

Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:19:38 -0800

Image Design: Sheahan Virgin

Snapshot

Whether or not Mitt Romney wins Republican primaries in Michigan and Arizona tonight, there is no denying the fact that, since his January 31 victory in Florida and February 4 win in Nevada, the last few weeks have been surprisingly difficult for the former Massachusetts governor. According to Romney surrogate New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, the Republican National Committee’s new rules (which led to more states allocating delegates by proportional representation)—not Mitt Romney and his declining vote shares relative to 2008—are at fault for his candidate’s recent travails. Blaming the rules for one’s poor performance or failure to meet expectations is certainly not a novel political strategy, but Christie’s statement—as we will see—gets a lot wrong. Just ask his state’s voters, which now are far more likely to vote in a meaningful primary.

* * *

There was a time after the New Hampshire primary when it seemed as though Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney would roll to victory early in the battle for his party’s nomination. Certainly, the stage was favorably set, the former Massachusetts governor possessing an impressive financial advantage, a swath of endorsements, and poll numbers indicating him to be the most competitive Republican candidate in prospective general election matchups against President Barack Obama. Although Romney struggled to bring conservative voters into his fold, he seemed to benefit from that voting bloc’s division among rival candidates battling for the “anti-Romney” mantle. When a prominent, well-funded Super PAC began spending heavily on his behalf, all the piece seemed to be in place.

And at first, the results conformed to expectations: an apparent razor-thin victory in the Iowa caucuses followed by a win in the New Hampshire primary. Romney, it seemed, was on his way. Then, the storm came. Finalized vote totals out of Iowa showed rival Rick Santorum besting Romney. Shortly after, Romney stumbled in South Carolina, losing by a large margin to a resurgent, reinvigorated Newt Gingrich. After a come-from-behind, face-saving win in Florida at the end of January, Romney’s regained frontrunner status took yet another blow, this time from Santorum, who stunned Romney (not to mention the entire professional punditocracy) on February 7, winning in Colorado, Minnesota, and Missouri to surge ahead nationally.

With Romney’s position increasingly precarious, some supporters within the party establishment, as The New Yorker reported recently, are “expressing misgivings,” with POLITICO adding that a cohort of GOP powerbrokers—looking to a brokered convention—have begun searching privately for an undeclared candidate to play the role of “savior.” As the race winds its way into March, Romney and his team—given the swings in momentum over the course of the campaign and Santorum’s vow to fight until the end of the schedule—are in the process of reformulating their strategy, preparing for a nomination battle that lasts longer than they had anticipated.

* * *

The question everyone seems to be asking is why a man with Mitt Romney’s advantages has been unable to defeat his opponents and claim the nomination, a query ABC’s George Stephanopoulos recently put to Romney backer, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie. Governor Christie, subscribing to the school of thought that the best defense is the attack, blamed his candidate’s problems on the Republican National Committee’s new rules that led to more states using proportional representation for the allocation of delegates to the Republican National Convention. Calling the rule change “a mistake,” Christie continued:

It’s just going to string this thing out against an incumbent president. It just makes no sense for us as a party. That’s why I voted “no,” and I hope the people in the party who voted “yes” for that are now rethinking their position…as a party, we should never have changed the rules, because what we’re doing now is we’re creating ourselves problems we don’t need.

In his statement, Christie appears to make two arguments: first, that the present extended nomination battle is the fault of proportional rules, and second, that an extended nomination battle—whatever its cause—is undesirable for the party.

Regarding the first argument, Christie’s preemptive strike against the GOP’s proportional rules misses a key point. Although it is true that a candidate cannot win a nomination without collecting a majority of delegates and that proportional rules do affect delegate distribution, such rules cannot be blamed for Romney’s present struggles. This is because Mitt Romney does not have a delegate problem, he has a vote problem. And if a candidate cannot win the most votes in a given contest, he or she misses out on critical momentum—in the form of increased donations, media attention, and event attendance—the true life giving force of a campaign.

If anything, this year’s election cycle has demonstrated the difficulty Romney has faced in winning voters over to his side. Most glaringly, he has lost states to his opponents—and therefore lost out on momentum—not once, but five times. As further evidence of Romney’s electoral weakness, he has won smaller vote shares compared to his own candidacy in 2008 in six of the nine states that have voted so far (see our Romney vs. Romney feature). As Romney has struggled with voters, he has let his opponents back in the race.

Whether losing states to other candidates or failing to match himself circa 2008, Romney’s underwhelming 2012 performance, then, is not attributable to him shedding a few delegates to Santorum here and a few to Gingrich and Ron Paul there, as a result of proportionality. Importantly, proportional rules for delegate allocation only come into play after voters have cast their ballots. As The Washington Post put it, “The fact that a new [challenger] emerges each time [Romney] vanquishes another betrays the existence of a deeper discontent with Romney himself.” In other words, the GOP race is “historically volatile” in part because of Romney, not in spite of him.

Christie’s second argument—that a protracted nomination battle is a “problem” for the party—is certainly not new, and indeed many other Republican governors—including some who have not endorsed a candidate—have raised similar concerns. In 2008, as Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were mired in a highly acrimonious and seemingly never-ending nomination battle, many Democrats initially expressed similar concerns. Protracted intra-party battles, the traditional (and tired) argument goes, prevent a party from focusing on and uniting against its general election adversary (in this case President Obama) and risk bloodying the party’s eventual nominee.

But as 2008 showed, this conventional wisdom does not always reflect reality. Although initially political analysts thought John McCain’s early nomination victory would benefit his candidacy by allowing an earlier pivot to the general election, it soon became clear that the Democrats were benefiting from their lengthier process. Not only did McCain and the GOP endure a virtual media blackout as journalists covered each new round of the Democratic contest and highlighted the party’s message, but it prevented McCain from building campaign operations in states that had not hosted early GOP contests.

Furthermore, a preference for a shorter nomination battle is highly troubling democratically. In 2012, a truncated race for the GOP nomination would mean many millions of Republican voters would have no say in selecting their party’s nominee, including those in the governor’s home state of New Jersey, not set to vote until June 5. We can assume that if the governor thought on February 22 that the GOP nomination battle—after just a handful of state contests—was a “problem” that made “no sense” for his party, he would look upon the possibility of a June campaign between Romney and his opponents with trepidation. But as FairVote has noted before, in a truly democratic system, all voters, not just those in a few privileged early states, should have the right to participate in a meaningful contest and a fair process.

Democratic rights aside, Christie—in arguing for an early knockout—seems to prioritize the interests of his candidate over those of his state. For instance, one could argue a competitive Republican race in June to be a good thing for the New Jersey GOP, invigorating and galvanizing a party in a Democratic-leaning state and prepping state Republican voters for the coming general election. A competitive Republican primary would also bring attention a state long accustomed to the neglect and indifference of major party candidates.

Indeed, this is the reason why the RNC—having seen the way in which Obama vs. Clinton energized Democrats and put many Republican-leaning states in play—changed its rules two years ago. Can forcing Romney to contest primaries and caucuses in traditionally “blue” states, such as California (where Republicans are enthusiastic about having a contest that matters), really be a bad thing if it lays the groundwork for a possible general election campaign that forces President Obama to defend his own backyard? After all, Obama’s surprise wins in Indiana and North Carolina in 2008 were boosted by the campaign operations he had built in those state’s during the hotly contested Democratic primary.

* * *

It is natural for Governor Christie to defend his candidate. Such is what adroit surrogates do. If the governor wants to debate the merits of proportional rules, then that is fine. But to blame such rules for the struggles of Mitt Romney is simply to play loose with the facts. Even worse, the governor’s desire to avoid a nomination process in which more Americans—rather than fewer—get to participate demonstrates a sobering disregard for the democratic principles upon which our nation was supposedly founded.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A History and Analysis of Relevant Supreme Court Cases

Fri, 23 Sep 2011 08:52:37 -0700

Fuzzy Math: Wrong Way Reforms for Allocating Electoral College Votes

Sun, 28 Jun 2009 16:20:29 -0700

Legality of the Use of Ranked Choice Absentee Ballots for Military and Overseas Voters

Thu, 07 Jul 2011 12:15:17 -0700

This report analyzes the potential legal issues with the use of ranked choice absentee ballots for military and overseas voters. Ranked choice absentee ballots enable U.S. citizens covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) to cast votes in runoff elections in states where the ballot turnaround time between first and second elections is short. Three states and one municipality have adopted ranked choice absentee ballots for military and overseas voters, including for federal and state primary and general runoff elections in Arkansas and federal and state primaries in South Carolina and Louisiana. The use of ranked choice absentee ballots is unlikely to violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, or to disenfranchise absentee voters. In addition, these ballots may help states avoid litigation under UOCAVA.