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BusinessWeek Before Tom Delay got to Congress 19 years
ago, he was an exterminator back in Texas. But the Republican Majority
Leader's true calling may be as a House painter with only one color on his
palette -- red. Last year, DeLay was behind a bold remap of Lone Star
congressional districts that is likely to deliver control of the state's
House delegation to Republicans.
Find Law's Writ The Supreme Court's recent 5-4 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer rejected a challenge to politically gerrymandered districts for Pennsylvania's delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives. In so doing, the decision seemingly gave state legislatures and governors the green light--at least for now--to continue using sophisticated computer databases to draw electoral district lines in ways that consistently undermine principles of democratic government. But the apparent green light may prove to be a yellow light. Justice Scalia's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court only attracted four votes: his own plus those of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas. The fifth and decisive vote for the result in the case came from Justice Kennedy--who endorsed the result, but whose "swing vote" was based on a different view of the law. Kennedy agreed with the other four justices in the majority that no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" had yet been proposed for the adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims--and therefore that the plaintiffs' challenge to the Pennsylvania apportionment plan must fail. But unlike the four, he also left open the possibility that future plaintiffs in future cases might offer a constitutionally satisfactory standard. Will the slim hope Justice Kennedy offered those who would challenge partisan gerrymandering prove to be a false hope? That remains to be seen. But in the meantime, no one should read the Vieth decision as a clean bill of health for our increasingly nasty and partisan politics. The Apparent Issue in Vieth: Partisan Gerrymandering As Edward Lazarus explained in an earlier column on this site, recent advances in computer technology have enabled politicians to draw electoral maps in ways that all but assure the election of their favored candidates. Consider Pennsylvania's example. As a whole, the state is more or less evenly split between Democratic and Republican voters. But both houses of the legislature and the statehouse were in Republican hands when these bodies set about redistricting after the 2000 census. As a result, these bodies were able to create relatively safe seats for Republicans in nearly two thirds of the state's federal districts. Thus, a state that is actually about one-half Republican is represented as if it were about two-thirds Republican. As Lazarus and others have noted, partisan gerrymandering--along with the practice of gerrymandering to protect incumbents--has reduced to a handful the number of Congressional districts in which truly competitive elections occur. How are these safe seats for Republicans and Democrats created? Generally, either voters are "packed" into the representatives' districts, or the representatives benefit from political gerrymandering in states where they control the legislative process. And the problem isn't just that elections aren't competitive. It is also that having "safe" seats that are, in effect, uncontested, tends to result in the election of representatives who skew towards the parties' respective extremes. And that, in turn, leads to polarization, rather than moderation and compromise, in Congress. For most observers, therefore, Vieth was a case about the health of our democracy. Would the Court recognize the threats to self-rule from non-competitive elections and sharp partisan division? The Court Views the Issue Through the Lens of the "Political Question" Doctrine In the Supreme Court, however, the issue was posed somewhat differently. The Justices saw the question as one of jurisdiction. For them, the issue was whether the Supreme Court--as opposed to Congress or the states themselves--was the appropriate institution to address the problems arising out of political gerrymandering. Their answer was "no," or, given Justice Kennedy's crucial fifth vote, perhaps "not yet." Justice Scalia's opinion for a plurality of the Court concludes that political gerrymandering cases present what's known in constitutional doctrine as a "political question." The basic concept of a political question is simple enough: The Constitution either explicitly or implicitly assigns to a political branch of government, rather than to the courts, some constitutional questions. (The political question doctrine is a subset of the general doctrine of justiciability--whether a given legal question ought to be addressed by a court.) For example, in the 1993 case of Nixon v. United States, the Court found that a federal judge who challenged the process by which the Senate had removed him from office, following his impeachment by the House, raised a political question. The Senate, not the Court, the Justices said, gets to decide what procedures are proper in this circumstance. Why does the Senate have the power? The Constitution assigns to the Senate "the sole power to try all impeachments," and that assignment, the Court ruled, included the final authority to determine what counts as a trial. Accordingly, the Justices refused to entertain former Judge Nixon's argument that the Senate acted impermissibly when it assigned the task of hearing evidence to a committee whose report went to the full Senate, rather than taking evidence on the Senate floor itself. The Murky Line Between Political Questions and Justiciable Cases If Nixon was a relatively easy case, the application of the political question doctrine has often been unclear. In the leading precedent, the 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, distilled the prior political question cases into a six-factor test. The first factor--whether the Constitution's text demonstrably commits the issue to another branch--seems the easiest to apply. In the Nixon case, for example, the Constitution's text pointed to the Senate, rather than the Court. In Vieth, Justice Scalia suggests that the first Baker factor renders all political gerrymandering claims political questions. He points out that under the Constitution, Congress has the authority to "alter such Regulations" regarding federal election districts that the states initially make. If Congress has that power, Justice Scalia's opinion indicates, then the Court lacks it. But this argument cannot be dispositive because Baker itself involved a claim that a state had abused the power of drawing district lines. In Baker the Court ruled that a challenge to Tennessee's gross deviation from the principle of one-person-one-vote in drawing district lines did not present a political question. The substance of the claims in Baker and Vieth was different, but the relevant constitutional text was the same. And Congress's power to alter state regulations of federal election districts was not exclusive of judicial inquiry in Baker. So why should it have been in Vieth? Are There Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards to Measure Political Gerrymandering Claims? Because the constitutional text was not dispositive in Vieth, the critical issue there was the second Baker factor: whether there are "judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" claims of political gerrymandering. The plurality in Vieth said there were neither, and therefore concluded the case presented a political question. What are "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"? Discoverable standards are those that can be traced to the Constitution's text, structure, history and so forth, such that the courts can honestly say that their decision is guided by law, rather than made up out of whole cloth. Manageable standards are those that lead to predictable and sensible results, such that actors (like state legislatures) subject to them can conform their conduct to law. In a 1986 case, Davis v. Bandemer, the Court ruled that political gerrymandering cases did not present a political question, but the Justices disagreed on the relevant standard. In the interim period between Bandemer and Vieth, the lower courts interpreted Bandemer as setting so difficult a standard that no electoral district has been declared unconstitutional as the product of political gerrymandering. And in Vieth, the plurality concluded that Bandemer should be overruled. There are no judicially discoverable standards, the Vieth plurality concluded, because everyone acknowledges that some political matters may legitimately be considered in apportionment decisions. To draw a line beyond which politics have played too great an influence, the plurality said, would be arbitrary. That line would not be rooted in the Constitution, and thus not judicially discoverable. Likewise, the plurality in Vieth said, none of the tests for "too much politics" were manageable. The root problem, as Justice Scalia saw it, is that there is no neutral baseline against which to measure whether a political group has been deprived of political power to which it is otherwise entitled. Party registration figures, results from statewide elections, and the like, he noted, do not necessarily tell us how people would have voted in particular Congressional district elections had the lines been drawn differently. Was the Plurality in Vieth Right? The Vieth plurality opinion is not wholly persuasive. It is true that to "discover" a relevant constitutional standard, the Court would have had to, in effect, make one up. But of course that's true in nearly every area of constitutional law where the Constitution's text speaks in majestic generalities. For example, the Court's equal protection cases say that certain "suspect classifications" identified by the Court trigger "strict scrutiny"--a term invented by the Court to capture the inquiry into whether a state has adopted the "least restrictive means" of advancing a "compelling state interest." Likewise, the Court has discovered a principle of "state sovereign immunity" that bars individuals from suing states without their consent, with an important exception. Individuals can be authorized to do so if Congress enacts a law that is "congruent and proportionate" to what the Justices themselves, under tests of their own devising, would consider a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of the words in quotation marks in the previous two paragraphs are found in the Constitution itself; yet that has not stopped the Court from "discovering" them in the Constitution. One might, of course, think that certain of these tests are misguided, and perhaps that is what the Vieth plurality thinks. But if that is so, they ought to acknowledge that their analysis would require them to overturn most of modern constitutional law. What about manageability? The plaintiffs and dissenters in Vieth argued that standards for political gerrymandering are manageable because they can simply be borrowed from a parallel line of cases--those in which the Court has said that racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional. But the Vieth plurality rejected the race analogy, on the ground that whereas race is a generally impermissible criterion in government decisionmaking, politics is not. There is a vast difference, the plurality said, between discerning whether an impermissible factor like race has been used, and discerning whether "too much" of a permissible factor like politics has been used. That is a fair point, but it seems largely to overlook the fact that the Court's racial gerrymandering cases do not ask simply whether race has been used as a factor in districting. Instead, they ask whether race was the "predominant" factor--that is, whether "too much" race has been used. The inquiries in racial and political gerrymandering cases thus do seem quite similar--and the dissenters seem to have the better of this argument. What Next for Political Gerrymandering Cases? A Process Proposal In the wake of Vieth, what should friends of democracy do to challenge political gerrymandering? The Vieth plurality suggests that they should take their case to Congress. Yet as the Vieth plurality itself also notes, the very Pennsylvania districts challenged in the case were created under pressure from "prominent national figures in the Republican Party." How likely is it that the national legislature will be sympathetic to a campaign to end political gerrymandering? The other option is to take Justice Kennedy at his word, and to try to devise a standard for judging political gerrymandering claims that he (and presumably the four Vieth dissenters) would deem manageable. I'll do my bit here by championing one such standard that my Columbia Law School colleague Professor Samuel Issacharoff has advocated: Political gerrymandering claims should be closely scrutinized unless the electoral districts were themselves drawn by a nonpartisan body, as occurs in some states. It is a basic principle of American constitutional law that in some circumstances, actors who are not politically accountable are better positioned to make the ground rules for those who are. Thus, we generally trust the courts to interpret the constitutional ground rules for politics because we think they are more likely to try to do the job fairly than are self-interested political actors. Even if the courts occasionally disappoint us by rendering what appear to be political judgments in the name of law, we can be certain that politicians will more often render political judgments, for that is the nature of their business. Applying this principle to the political gerrymandering context would mean that states should be given an incentive to turn their districting process over to bodies that stand at least at one remove from politics. And that is exactly what adoption of Professor Issacharoff's standard would strongly encourage. More competitive elections, and better government, would likely result. And surely a standard of law that produces such an outcome ought to count as "discoverable" in the Constitution
Chicago Tribune
Often it's a good thing for the courts to stay out of political disputes, leaving them to be settled by the people acting through elected institutions. But in this case, the democratic institutions have been drained of their democratic essence. If you don't like that you can't vote your representative out of office, what are you supposed to do about it? Vote your representative out of office? As if the situation weren't dire enough, some politicians want to redistrict more frequently than once a decade, which has long been the custom, so they can lock in any transient success at the polls. In Texas, the GOP-dominated legislature came up with a new map last year, replacing the one created in 2001. The goal is to let Republicans gain as many as seven additional seats in this year's elections. How can voters regain the central role they're supposed to have? One option is to divide power at the state level. A Democratic governor can check a Republican legislature, preventing either party from dominating the process. But in that case, elected officials may safeguard the party they cherish most the Incumbent Party. The best hope lies in more direct methods. Four years ago, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative taking redistricting away from the legislature and giving it to an appointed commission. A California legislator has proposed a referendum to turn it over to a three- judge panel. But no state has matched the success of Iowa. There, the task falls on the nonpartisan Legislative Service Bureau, which in drawing up districts is not allowed to factor in voting patterns and other political information. The result is that in 2002, with just five House seats, Iowa had three competitive races. Today, thanks to gerrymandering, we have government by the consent of governors. If Americans want to live in a democracy worthy of the name, they need to find ways to curb the excesses of partisan redistricting. That, or move to Iowa.
Philadelphia Inquirer People who dislike Congress' related penchants for permanent incumbency and strident partisanship were disappointed by the U.S. Supreme Court recently. In a familiar 5-4 split, the high court decided to let stand Pennsylvania's egregiously partisan congressional redistricting map. Don't give up hope, though. There's still Texas. The tortuous lines of the Texas redistricting map are scheduled for court scrutiny in June. Hard as it may be to believe for anyone who has looked at Pennsylvania's goofy map, Texas' situation is even more outrageous. Given the chance, a state's ruling political party has always exploited to its benefit the once-a-decade chance to redraw congressional districts. It's called gerrymandering, and both sides do it. Rare is the state where district boundaries are based primarily on logical communities of interest, with an eye to maintaining competitive balance. But in the age of the computer, gerrymandering has gained a poisonous precision. First, incumbents of both parties make deals to form districts that make it impossible for them to lose. Nowadays, no more than three dozen congressional seats are truly at risk in any election. In the rest, the lines ensure the incumbent will win, effectively disenfranchising voters who don't like him or her. Second, a party can now use technology to draw the lines so carefully that it derives an immense edge in elections even in states with evenly divided party registration. Pennsylvania Republicans redrew the lines so that an 11-10 GOP advantage in 2000 became a 12-7 split in 2002 (the state lost two seats in reapportionment after the census). This, even though Pennsylvania has more Democrats than Republicans. On Pennsylvania's map, several of the districts look like monsters from a Maurice Sendak children's book. The plaintiffs in the Pennsylvania case asked the court to overturn the map based on "discriminatory intent." The majority, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, would have none of it. Scalia wanted to go so far as to overrule a 1986 precedent that suggested a redistricting could be so grossly partisan as to be unconstitutional. Justice Paul Stevens, who dissented, rightly noted that such a hands-off approach "would give license, for the first time, to partisan gerrymanders that are devoid of any rational justification." Fortunately, Justice Anthony Kennedy - the swing vote to uphold Pennsylvania's map - would not slam the door on court intervention against a grotesquely partisan map. Kennedy said, in effect, that if you base a map precisely on citizens' demonstrated voting habits in such a way as to break up their natural community of interests, it might be an unconstitutional violation of their freedom of association. Odd reasoning. But as the nakedly partisan Texas map (a re-redrawing of lines to give the GOP an expected 22-10 advantage) comes up for review, this theory may be the best hope for voters who'd like to have a real choice at the polls, rather than merely anointing the incumbent every two years.
National Review In the 19th century, the British parliament system had become so rotten that Dunwich, a former seaport town that had literally sunk under the water, was still represented in parliament. The U.S. Congress doesn't have any Dunwiches, but it is being eaten away by its own form of systemic corruption ó the drawing of congressional districts to hand them irrevocably to one or another of the political parties. With the aid of sophisticated computer technology, politicos are able to draw congressional districts so safe that incumbents can hold on to them for a lifetime. In 2002, just four incumbent congressmen who faced non-incumbent challengers lost their reelection bids. Last week the Supreme Court declined to overturn a Pennsylvania congressional redistricting plan in a case highlighting the ongoing scandal of so-called gerrymandering. A hallmark of American democracy, the competitive election, is being wiped out, congressional line by congressional line. With the help of district lines sometimes so tortured that they look like works of abstract expressionism, incumbents have increased their reelection rate from 92 percent to 98 percent. That is a marginal-seeming but significant change. University of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato has a feature on his website tracking close congressional races. In 2002, it followed the "Nifty 50," the 50 most competitive races. This year it features the "Dirty 30." "And we had to stretch to get to 30," says Sabato. Eighty-one incumbents ran unopposed in 2002, according to the Center for Voting and Democracy. In 350 of the 435 congressional races, the winner won by more than 20 percent. The center projects an even less competitive congressional cycle this year. This means representatives increasingly operate without the factor that tends to force them to be representative ó the fear of defeat. On top of the friendly district lines, incumbents have perfected the art of reelection, refining the use of all their natural advantages, from direct mail, to paid staff, to access to the media. More and more, would-be challengers just don't bother. Republican Rep. Phil Gingrey narrowly won a district in Georgia in 2002, but faces no serious challenge this year. Even one-term incumbents in close districts are looking too formidable to challenge. The liberal press has only now noticed the problem of gerrymandering, its outrage apparently piqued by the fact that Republicans are now in a position to draw district lines. Governors and state legislatures collaborate in the process of redistricting every ten years with the new census. In 1990, their position in the states was so weak that Republicans alone could only draw lines for five congressional districts. In the 1980s districts were so heavily gerrymandered by Democrats that Republicans probably needed to win 60 percent of the total congressional vote to have a shot at a majority. One of the chief outrages of liberal reformers, Tom DeLay's recent redistricting of Texas, is only an effort to wipe away the effects of such a Democratic gerrymander. The Texas congressional delegation has been marginally Democratic, although the state is as "red" as they come and Republicans hold every statewide elected office. Now the delegation will be more representative. But reform that gores both Republicans and Democrats is necessary nationwide. The Supreme Court was right to take a pass in the Pennsylvania case. The court, already notorious for Bush v. Gore, shouldn't get any more involved in partisan politics. It is the public that will have to pressure the political system for change. States should adopt objective criteria for the drawing of districts, including contiguity and compactness that will limit somewhat the ability of the parties to play games. Bipartisan commissions should be given a significant role in drawing district lines. In Washington state, such a commission has created generally competitive districts so even a speaker of the House (Tom Foley) has lost a race there in recent memory. The goal should be to make it possible for most people to vote in a congressional election that matters. What a concept.
Desert Morning News Politics is inherently political. That may come as a shock
to some folks. Apparently so, considering all the fuss over how political
districts were redrawn nationwide after the 2000 Census.
Washington Post In the 2002 congressional elections, four incumbents who faced non-incumbent challengers met defeat. That was the fewest in American history, according to the Brookings Institution's Thomas E. Mann, but it was four too many as far as America's political leaders are concerned. If the nation's self-interested redistricters -- and, as of last week, its fence-sitting Supreme Court justices -- have their way, the entire Congress soon will be reelected by acclamation. Now, maybe that's a good thing. Maybe the success of only four challengers means that the other 431 members of Congress are doing a terrific job. Things are going so swimmingly, at home and abroad, that we don't need any new blood in the House of Representatives, nor even serious challengers for members with life tenure. Many Americans may not agree. But at the moment, most Americans have little control over the redistricting process that deprives them of a meaningful choice at election time, either for Congress or for their state legislators. The decreasing competitiveness in congressional elections is not much disputed. In the 2002 elections, 356 races were decided in landslides (by margins of more than 20 percent); in only 38 races was the margin 10 percent or less, according to the Center for Voting and Democracy, an advocate of electoral reform. Last year, in Virginia's election for state legislators, nearly two-thirds of all races didn't even field candidates from both major parties. Redistricting isn't the only reason for this. Republicans are tending to live near Republicans, Democrats near Democrats. "Person by person, family by family, America is engaging in voluntary political segregation," as The Post's David Von Drehle explained in an article on America's Red-Blue divide last Sunday. But redistricting plays a huge part. Though voting patterns change over time, new technology allows politicians to draw lines with more confidence than ever that they are creating safe Republican or Democratic seats. Sharper partisan divides give them more incentives to do so, and laws in most states offer no obstacles. It's not strictly accurate that the line-drawing is always intended to protect incumbents. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay instigated a redistricting in Texas, for example, that is meant to dislodge a number of incumbent Democratic members of Congress this fall. But then the seats are intended to remain safely in Republican hands. And often the two parties conspire to deprive voters of a choice. In Northern Virginia, for example, Rep. Jim Moran has been an embarrassment. But he enjoys a district so Democratic that no serious Republican challenge is likely. Republicans were happy to give him this comfortable home because it meant they could pack Republicans into two comfortable districts for their own Reps. Tom Davis and Frank Wolf. Good news for the congressmen: The only costs are that voters become irrelevant, voting becomes superfluous and politicians have no incentive to form coalitions or reach out to those in the minority. Last week, the Supreme Court declined, by a 5 to 4 vote, to invalidate a Pennsylvania political gerrymander. The justices said that because no one had proposed a persuasive standard -- how much gerrymandering is too much? -- they couldn't get involved. American political scientists tend to snicker if you suggest that maybe any gerrymandering is too much. This is a politician's game, after all; they've been drawing nefarious lines since colonial times; we wouldn't want to oversanitize things. But why not? At a recent Brookings conference, redistricting expert Lisa Handley said that most Western democracies have no trouble doing the job more fairly than the United States. In the United Kingdom, for example, civil servants redraw lines to reflect population changes, and they do not take into account where incumbents live or which party will benefit. "In most of the rest of the world, redistricting is not nearly as partisan or as contentious as it is here in the United States," she said. "We really are quite different than other Western democracies." The biggest difference may be that most of us -- more and more of us -- have almost no chance of replacing our representatives at election time, which you'd think would be the defining characteristic of democracy. It doesn't have to be this way, as Handley said. But the courts apparently aren't going to save our system from itself, and the politicians certainly won't voluntarily submit to the indignity of contested elections. Things will change only if people insist on it.
Washington Post The Supreme Court this week examined a fundamental breakdown in American democracy and responded with a shrug. The issue was redistricting, specifically whether the Constitution imposes any meaningful restraint on state legislatures that manipulate federal and state legislative districts for partisan advantage. Long a blight on American elections, redistricting has gotten wholly out of control in recent years. With sophisticated computer programs, politicians can draw lines to maximize precisely their party's representation and minimize the other's. The result is sham legislative elections in which fewer and fewer seats are competitive and moderates of both parties get squeezed out of office. Back in 1986 the court suggested that partisan gerrymanderings could offend the Constitution if they were bad enough, but in practice the decision has not functioned as a check on excesses. This year's case, involving partisan manipulations by Pennsylvania Republicans, presented an opportunity to make that promise meaningful. The justices declined the opportunity. Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice Antonin Scalia declared that, contrary to the 18-year-old precedent, political gerrymandering cases were not even a proper subject for judicial consideration. No court had ever articulated a clear standard, he argued, to determine when normal politics in redistricting becomes impermissible. And that suggests that the search for a stable, coherent principle of law is fruitless and should be abandoned. Mr. Scalia's argument has some force. Even the dissenters, who wanted -- as we do -- greater judicial supervision of redistricting, could not agree on what standard ought to guide it. But the trouble with leaving the problem to the political system, as Mr. Scalia would do, is that there is no basis for confidence the political system can fix it. Which politicians, after all, are going to give up their safe seats in the interests of systemic reform? Which party leaders are going to forsake a stronger caucus in the interest of more competitive elections? The argument for judicial vigilance is at its strongest in cases where the political process itself is encumbered. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy -- the fifth vote for rejecting the lawsuit -- agreed that no workable standard had arisen but held out the possibility that one might in the future, and he therefore refused to overrule the precedent. The consequence of the splintered decision is that political gerrymandering suits remain a theoretical possibility, though no more than that. As a practical matter, Mr. Scalia won the day, even though his legal argument did not: The political process will have to rise to the task of confronting redistricting, because the courts clearly won't. Voters of both parties have an overwhelming interest in making elections more competitive. It's going to take a coalition of the scope and seriousness of the one that made campaign finance reform a reality to bring about redistricting reform. Congress has the power to force state-level changes, and it must be pressured to do so. Legislatures, particularly those in states in which power is divided between the parties, need to be pushed as well. The most promising avenue for a national reform movement may be state ballot initiatives -- which can bypass the legislators whose interests reform would undermine. If medical marijuana can be made into a national cause using state ballot initiatives, surely democracy itself could muster a few votes.
Newsday.com
Faced with a case accusing Pennsylvania Republicans of unfairly creating
meandering, irregularly-shaped election districts purely for partisan
advantage, the Supreme Court punted last week. Announcing the fractured
decision to leave the contested districts intact, Justice Antonin Scalia
said the court has never been able to resolve claims of partisan
gerrymandering and should simply stop trying.
It shouldn't. Redistricting that outrageously stacks the deck in favor of any one political party is an affront to democracy. Such election districts, found in too many states, dilute the power of the vote of people who support an opposing party. They contribute to virulent partisanship in Washington and legislative paralysis in Albany. The top court should not abandon efforts to craft a usable standard for judging when the acceptable quest for partisan advantage has gone too far. In Pennsylvania, Republicans controlled the legislature and the governor's office when the 2000 Census forced the loss of two House seats. After Republicans adopted a partisan redistricting plan, the House delegation that had included 11 Democrats and 10 Republicans shifted to seven Democrats and 12 Republicans in 2002, even though enrolled Democrats outnumbered Republicans. A five-judge majority upheld the districts. Justice Anthony Kennedy, one of the five, took exception, however, to the conclusion that "political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims exist." He said in a concurring opinion that just because no workable standard has been found doesn't mean one can never be crafted. In fact, Kennedy and the four justices who dissented offered a variety of possibilities. The problem for the court is that, unlike racial gerrymandering which is blatantly illegal, angling for partisan advantage when drawing election districts is common, expected and generally legally acceptable. The conundrum for the court is how to determine when partisanship in an inherently political process is pushed so far that it offends the Constitution. The court crafted a standard in 1986, which said an effective challenge had to show intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect. But political affiliation is not immutable, as is race. People have many reasons for voting as they do, only one of which is a candidate's party. So after 18 years of what Scalia characterized as "essentially pointless litigation," the court this week abandoned its standard as unworkable. With a number of partisan gerrymandering cases in the pipeline, including a particularly egregious example engineered by Texas Republicans, the issue is too important for the court to walk away from in frustration.
Journal Times Online On Friday, when the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to block implementation of a voter redistricting plan in Texas, it
permitted an election that either brings politics into the 21st century or
is an old story of political repression. The fight about frequent redistricting plainly raises the question: Should we redistrict more often than once every 10 years? Yes We redraw districts now every 10 years because that's how often the Constitution requires a census. But that revered document doesn't say we can't count and change more often, and that may be more appropriate for our age. When the Constitution was signed in 1787, a decennial census was appropriate because transportation and communication were slow. Today we are much more mobile and connected. We are counted and questioned constantly with results reported in days, weeks or months. Our mobility has led to huge shifts in population, recently toward the south and west. These people shouldn't have to wait 10 years for their representation to catch up with their movements. We change government representatives quickly in frequent elections, so there's no good reason why our legislative districts shouldn't change to reflect the preferences and influence of the population. And critics of frequent redistricting miss one important point: No amount of boundary tinkering will save legislators if they offend voters. No Accurately representing the population is not the issue. Power is the issue. Legislative redistricting has historically been a tool of disenfranchisement, used to create voting districts that lock one group out of power and keep another in. The South went through this fight only 40 years ago. People marched and died for their right to be included in government. Current efforts in Texas and Colorado are attempts by political parties to create blocks of guaranteed votes so members are more likely to remain in power regardless of opposition. Rapid redistricting also will reduce legislative effectiveness and reduce participation in our republic. Legislators, already obsessed with staying in office, will now have less reason to attend to the business of state as they struggle to get and keep power bases. Opponents seeking retribution for power-grabs will have less reason to compromise on legislation. Voters will be confronted by frequent changes of their voting districts and polling places. People won't make heroic efforts to be model citizen if they're unable to find out what district they live in and find out who and what they're voting for. They'll give up and stop voting. Thus, frequent redistricting is just another recipe to advance a power elite and keep it in power.
A three-judge federal panel in Texas has, for now, handed the GOP a win in the Lone Star state by approving a new map for congressional seats that Republicans said better reflects their recent election victories among Texas voters. The case will go to the Supreme Court, focusing a national debate over how redistricting issues should be settled - by voters, courts, or Congress. This ruling helps end a long stand-off that saw Democratic lawmakers flee the state twice to avoid voting on the GOP map. And it also comes after decades of Texas Democrats gerrymandering congressional lines to suit incumbents and interest groups, and a court-ordered redistricting in 2001 due to a deadlock in the legislature. The federal panel ruled that the US Constitution does not prevent state legislatures from engaging in partisan redistricting or breaking the tradition of redistricting soon after the US Census. Nor did this particular GOP-drawn map violate the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. It was "politics, pure and simple," they said, even while adding they were troubled by this "grasp of power" phenomenon. The judges had this advice, though: "Congress can assist by banning mid-decade redistricting, which it has the clear constitutional authority to." Redistricting is regularly necessary to better reflect demographic shifts in the voting populace. This may be too much to ask, but it shouldn't be used for partisan purposes or to protect incumbents. Politicians should be elected on their merits, not on their skill in drawing odd map boundaries. New technology has made redistricting easier, quicker, and ever more precise - an advance that should be used to help better reflect the voting population rather than more finely carving up congressional seats. Voters shouldn't sit back and let the courts or Congress solve this problem. They can pressure candidates to support measures on when redistricting should be done, and how each district should reflect equality, contiguity, unity, and compactness.
The political battle in states over redrawing congressional districts has reached the courts December 25, 2003
KWAME HOLMAN: The House of Representatives is called the "People's House." Its makeup is supposed to reflect the distribution of population across the country. And so the Constitution requires that states use census data, collected every ten years, to redraw the boundaries of their congressional districts to reflect population shifts. That's not really an issue in Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Delaware, Vermont and Alaska. Those states have populations small enough to warrant only one at-large representative in the House. But in large states such as Texas, with a congressional delegation that numbers 32, redrawing congressional maps is a complex process that often involves statistical math, creative drawing and of course, politics. It's the responsibility of state legislatures to redraw the maps with final approval given by the governors. In states where one political party dominates, it's an easy process. Legislative leaders simply redraw the boundaries, usually giving their party the best chance of winning the most congressional seats. But if state government is divided, the remapping process can result in a stalemate. That's what happened in Texas after the year 2000 census. The Republican majority in the Senate and the Democratic-controlled House couldn't agree on a new congressional map, and so a panel of federal judges stepped in and drew one. But when Republicans grabbed control of the Texas House after the 2002 election, their counterparts in Congress -- most notably House Majority Leader Tom DeLay -- urged the governor and the now majority Republican Texas legislature to throw out the court-approved map and draw one more to their liking. This was Texas Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst, a Republican, last summer: LT. GOV. DAVID DEWHURST: We're going to draw a map that's fair, that's a Texas map that reflects the interest of the people of Texas -- one that'll represent the fact that the majority of people here in Texas like President George W. Bush, want to see a strong national defense, want to see lowered taxes; at the same time will reflect Democratic voters, independent voters here in the state of Texas. KWAME HOLMAN: But the map Texas Republicans eventually drew, according to most political observers who've studied it, would shift dramatically the ratio of the congressional delegation. Currently 17 Democrats and 15 Republicans, it could shift to 22 Republicans and ten Democrats after the next election, sending seven more Republicans to Congress. Jim Dunnam is leader of the House Democratic caucus. SEN. TED STEVENS: REP. JIM DUNNAM: Think of the instability in our country. If every time, every two years we redistrict Congress just because we could, or we didn't ... or the people in power didn't like who the people were electing, what kind of instability would that create in our federal government? KWAME HOLMAN: Texas Democrats didn't go down without a fight, and their protests made for great political theater. In May, 51 state House Democrats flew north to Oklahoma, to deprive the Texas legislature of the quorum required to vote on the new map. In July, a dozen state Senate Democrats fled west to New Mexico. Texas' Republican Gov. Rick Perry called them home. GOV. RICK PERRY: My Democrat friends, it's time to come back to work. There is still time to address the priorities of the people if you join your regular legislators in the spirit of bipartisanship. KWAME HOLMAN: Eventually, the outnumbered Democrats did come home, opting instead to take their chances in court. Three weeks ago, in a similar case in Colorado, the state Supreme Court ruled against that Republican legislature. As in Texas, Colorado Republicans this year redrew a court-ordered map after they gained control of their legislature. But the Colorado Supreme Court declared the map unconstitutional saying, "having failed to redistrict when it should have, the General Assembly has lost its chance to redistrict until after the 2010 federal census." Colorado Republicans hold a five to two seat advantage in the congressional delegation. But if the state Supreme Court ruling stands, Democrats say they could compete for two of those Republican seats next year. However, the most important challenge to a redistricting plan was argued two weeks ago before the United States Supreme Court. In that case, Pennsylvania Democrats charged that the Republican-controlled legislature designed a new congressional district map purely for partisan advantage. The map reflected Pennsylvania's loss of two congressional seats after the 2000 census, but Democrats suffered the consequences. The map Republicans drew pitted Democrats against Democrats, placing the homes of veteran Congressmen Frank Mascara and John Murtha into one district, and those of Robert Borski and Joe Hoeffel into another. Murtha and Mascara were forced into a primary fight, which Murtha won. And Borski, rather than fight Hoeffel, retired. And so Republicans took the one-seat advantage they had held in the state's congressional delegation prior to the 2002 elections, and actually added to it. Democrats, in all, lost three seats. What attorneys for the Democrats want the Supreme Court justices to do is establish neutral criteria to help determine the shapes of future districts drawn for congressional elections. MARGARET WARNER: Last Friday, a federal appeals court panel gave preliminary approval to the new congressional map for Texas, drawn by Republicans. Texas Democrats said they would appeal that ruling. Terry Smith has more. TERENCE SMITH: We take up the debate now with two election law experts. Pam Karlan of the Stanford University Law School and John Yoo of Boalt Hall Law School at the University of California at Berkeley. He served in the Bush administration as the deputy assistant attorney general in the office of legal counsel. Welcome to you both. Pam Karlan, what's at the heart of this argument that is now before the Supreme Court? PAM KARLAN: Well, it's a question about whether the Constitution imposes any limits on partisan districting, and if it does, what those limits are and whether a court can enforce them. TERENCE SMITH: John Yoo, is that the way you see it? JOHN YOO: Yeah, I agree with Pam. The question is, you know, not whether politics can come into play in drawing districts. TERENCE SMITH: Because they clearly do. JOHN YOO: They clearly have, they have since the very first elections in our country. For example, the word "gerrymandering" comes from Elbridge Gerry who was accused of making the very first districts, who's also the drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789. So it's been with us from the beginnings as a republic. But the other question is, exactly as Pam put it, not that politics can't come in, but do courts really have the ability or have any role in policing how far politics can go? TERENCE SMITH: Well, should they, Pam? Are they the right venue for this? PAM KARLAN: Well, there has to be some limit on how far politics can go, and one of the hard questions is whether what you want to look at is the output, you know, how many seats the Democrats and how many seats the Republicans get. Or whether you what you want to look at instead is the process by which redistricting is done. For example the way Colorado court did, and it said you can redistrict once and once that redistricting is done, you can't keep revisiting the issue and tweaking the lines. TERENCE SMITH: Well, what about that, John? The notion here in at least two of these cases, in Texas and Colorado, legislatures are attempting to redistrict what we could call mid-cycle, between the two tenure censuses. Is that a problem? JOHN YOO: No, and the thing I think that is problematic is, you know, courts obviously play a big role in lots of things in society. They decide what's free speech and what's not free speech. But I do think there's a real problem with courts trying to come up with a standard for what goes too far. So for example, there have been situations where majorities of ... parties have won 51 percent of an electoral vote in a state and only gotten 40 percent of the congressional seats. Is that politics going too far? What if they had won 60 percent or 70 percent and still ended up with only 40 percent of the seats? You know, it reminds you of the effort that courts once made a long time ago to try to police competition in a different kind of market, the real market, not the political market. And courts, for a while, tried to figure out how much market power is how much too much, how can one company dominate an entire economic market. And courts eventually gave up on that trying to look at what is called the output side of it because there's no real standard that courts can apply to try to figure out when politics has gone too far and something is actually unconstitutional. TERENCE SMITH: Pam Karlan, when you look at Texas case, which provided so much drama, you had something different there. You had federal ... active federal involvement in the person of the House majority leader, Tom DeLay. Does that change the equation? PAM KARLAN: Well, the reason that the federal court got involved in the first place is because the state of Texas and its political bodies, the legislature and the governor, couldn't agree on a plan. And when the 2000 census came out, they had to redraw the state's districts. They couldn't agree, and a federal court stepped in then. I think everybody understands that federal courts sometimes do have to step in because, otherwise, Texas would have had a bunch of seats with no districts for them and a bunch of districts that had changed dramatically in their populations since 1990, and you would have had a real inequality of representation. So the federal courts had to step in, and the question is just when the legislature defaults, should it get a second bite at the same apple? TERENCE SMITH: What about that, John Yoo? Should it, a second bite? JOHN YOO: You know, I think so. I think that, you know, this really should be something that's up to the legislatures, and I can see why in some people's mind it doesn't seem right that you could have one party controlling the statehouse, controlling districts and maybe the party control over those districts ends up being out of whack with the population. But you know, I think the important thing to keep in mind is that's the way the framers drafted the Constitution. Our constitutional system is not a pure democracy. You know, every district is not necessarily drawn so that 51 percent of the people pick all 51 percent of the representatives. And so one of the things the framers built into our system was to allow states to have a certain amount of control over the way federal officials were selected. For example, senators used to be chosen by state legislatures directly. So it shouldn't be unusual that state legislatures, even if they're the party representation there is a little bit out of what can with the representation in the Congress from that state, should be able to draw the districts in a way to favor their preferences. TERENCE SMITH: But let me ask you both ... or Pam Karlan especially, if that happened even more than once in a ten-year cycle, if the political leadership changed in a state legislature, what would you do? Redistrict every two years? PAM KARLAN: Well, that kind of gets at what the real problem here is, which is the framers didn't really anticipate the kind of districts we have today or the kinds of political gerrymanders we have today. We didn't actually have congressional districts in every state until the 1840s. Now in the 19th century, people redistricted again and again and again, and partisan politics was really fierce. I actually think the bigger problem today is, when the districts are drawn, as they are, they often either don't represent constituents at all. And I'll just say here that one of the ways you can till tell a district is a little bit suspicious is if it has a nickname. Like for example, in Texas, in this latest re-redistricting, they drew a district from Hidalgo County, which is on the Mexican border, up to Austin. Everybody, everyone is now calling it the "fajita district," because it's a long thin strip of meat. And when you have a district like that, you know that something's gone wrong. People in Hidalgo County and people in Austin don't share a media market, they don't share political organizations. There's nothing to connect them except essentially empty pieces of land. TERENCE SMITH: Is that wrong, John Yoo? JOHN YOO: I don't see why it is. I mean, I don't see why because you have that kind of funny fajita district -- there's something in Pennsylvania called the "upside-down Chinese dragon district" -- why should it matter so much that courts have to come in and say, "this is unconstitutional"? Why can't you rely on the political process to fix any kind of problems? Maybe the Republicans in Texas are going too far. Someday the Democrats in Texas will retake power again, and they could employ the same strategy. You'll have tit for tat or mutually shared destruction strategy where both sides will, you know, damp down if they're going too far in order to make sure it doesn't happen to them in the future. The real question is: Why should this all be unconstitutional, not whether not whether it's a just a bad idea or not. TERENCE SMITH: Well, the courts will decide that. But in the meantime, Pam Karlan, the critics argue that this leads to a polarization in Congress, and reduces competition for seats. In effect, it's an incumbent's insurance policy. Is it? PAM KARLAN: Well, I think that's absolutely right. Only 10 percent of the congressional districts in the country are competitive; that is, districts in which there's a reasonable chance of either party's candidate winning. In about as many districts, one of the two major political parties doesn't even put up a candidate. And if you look at which state has the most competitive districts in the country, it's Iowa. And one of the reasons they have the most competitive districts is because they don't allow the state legislature to redistrict. In Iowa, an independent commission redistricts. The closest congressional race in the country, the last time around, was in Colorado, and the Republicans were quite candid that one of the reasons they want to re-redistrict there is to make sure that that congressman, who faced a real competition from the Democrats, won't have any competition this next time around. TERENCE SMITH: John Yoo, that point that Pam Karlan is making in Colorado is a very good example. They were, in effect, using it to create a specific political outcome. Does that give you any pause? JOHN YOO: No, it doesn't. And to respond to your question directly, is there polarization going on? Certainly there's no doubt polarization is going on... TERENCE SMITH: As a result of redistricting is what I'm asking. JOHN YOO: That's the question: Is it really a really of redistricting? Look at the Senate, which doesn't have districts. Isn't it the case that you have enormous polarization there. You have the inability of the Senate to confirm certain kinds of judges now, and you have filibusters which were unheard of 20 years ago of judicial nominees. So is that really being caused by redistricting or not? Incumbency rates are certainly high, but again, let's compare it to other kinds of elections that don't districts. Incumbency rates for governors, state's attorneys general, and senators are all extremely high, too, very close to the range of the members of the House of Representatives. It seems that it might just be that the problems that people are worried about really arising from more broader political changes, and redistricting isn't really getting at the problem or it really isn't the problem and it really isn't the solution. TERENCE SMITH: Pam Karlan, what do you think that have because you sound as though you feel that redistricting is, in its way, shaping the Congress? PAM KARLAN: Well, I think the rates of reelection of incumbents are substantially higher, actually, in the house than they are in the Senate. TERENCE SMITH: They are. PAM KARLAN: And part of that is a result of redistricting. And I think it also has a spillover effect into all of our politics, that you're more likely as a congressman either to die in office or be indicted than you are to lose your seat in an actual general election. And that's worrisome. TERENCE SMITH: All right, for better for worse, it's now in the hands of the courts. So thank you both, Pam Karlan, John Yoo, very much. JOHN YOO: Thank you. PAM KARLAN: Thank you.
Find Law's Writ In Isaac Asimov's science fiction classic, The Foundation Trilogy, the science of statistics has become so advanced that the future of government and society can be predicted with terrifying accuracy. Although free will may exist at the individual level, it effectively disappears in every circumstance of group behavior, because the ultimate outcome of all group conduct can be known by statisticians in advance. Life is once again imitating art. Armed with the data-manipulating power of new computers, political operatives can now effectively predetermine the results of most elections. All they must do to accomplish this, is to re-jigger the boundaries of electoral districts to include certain voters and exclude others. This improved predictive capability opens the door to at least two kinds of mischief. First, it allows the political party that controls a state legislature at the time of redistricting to reconfigure electoral districts to lock in its partisan majority. Second, it allows incumbent legislators an ability to design safe seats for themselves and, thus, preclude meaningful competition in subsequent elections Does the Constitution prohibit this kind of outcome-determinative political "gerrymandering" - as the practice is known? That is the question now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer. During the December 10 oral argument in the case, the Justices showed little inclination to curb the practice. However, it would much better for our democracy if they would do so. A pre-decided election is perilously close to no election at all -- no matter who is favored. And incumbents, in particular, already have such a great advantage, that their attempts to amplify that advantage through gerrymandering ought to be especially troubling to us all. The Facts of the Pennsylvania Case The case currently before the high court comes from Pennsylvania. As a result of the 2000 census, that state lost two of its 21 congressional districts. It thus fell to the state legislature to redraw the boundaries of the state's remaining 19 districts. Generally speaking, Pennsylvanians vote Republican and Democratic in roughly equal numbers. In the 2000 election, Al Gore won the state with just under 51% of the vote. By the same token, at the time of the census, the state's congressional delegation contained 11 Republicans and 10 Democrats. As it happened, however, at the time for redistricting, both houses of the state legislature (which devises the electoral maps), as well as the governorship, were controlled by the Republicans. And using the new advances in voter databases, mapping, and other computer technologies, they went about locking in their majority with a vengeance. Pennsylvania's Republicans could have chosen a neutral principle by which to draw the boundaries. One option would have been to maximize the geographic "compactness" of districts. Another would have been to adhere to natural or historical boundaries. But they eschewed both options. Instead, they created a kaleidoscope of meandering districts carefully calibrated to achieve two goals. One was to push Democratically-inclined voters into a small number of districts. The other was to spread Republican voters in a way that would give them the greatest influence on electoral outcomes. This kind of gerrymandering can have dramatic -- and pernicious -- results. Consider three counties, each of which has a 50/50 split between Democrats and Republicans. What you have is true democracy: Candidates' views will matter as to how the balance is tipped. The outcome is completely up for grabs. But now gerrymander these same counties so that one county has virtually 100 percent Democrats, and the other two each have 25 percent Democrats. The outcome is virtually pre-set: One Democrat Congressperson, and two Republicans. Given possibilities like this one, it's no surprise that in the end, the Republicans succeeded in a drawing a map that, at least until the next redistricting, was almost certain to guarantee that Republicans would control 12 or more of the state's 19 congressional seats, even if, on a statewide basis, half of Pennsylvania's voters cast ballots for Democratic candidates. If Pennsylvanians' party preferences were truly taken into account, the State should have 9 or 10 Republican representatives. Now, however, they are virtually certain to have 12 or more. That's not democracy; it's an outrage. Put another way, Pennsylvania's Republicans assured their party of at least two more seats in Congress than they would have obtained if redistricting had been done on a non-partisan basis. So much for a level playing field -- Democrats are not only facing an uphill battle, they are facing one that is, in many districts, practically unwinnable. And the result is all the sadder in a state that is so evenly-decided that reasoned debate -- not head-counting -- could have carried the day. The Pennsylvania Tactics Have Been Used In Other States, As Well Worse, this phenomenon is not limited to Pennsylvania. Republican-dominated state legislatures in Texas and Colorado have been engaged in the same enterprise. (Indeed, the political gerrymandering in these states is even more egregious than in Pennsylvania because it is occurring only two years after the last redistricting -- rather than in accord with the customary ten year cycle regulated by the census). Not surprisingly, Democrats are threatening to retaliate in states they control. And one important thing to realize about this tactic is that, in the end, every voter loses. Which party manages to entrench itself through gerrymandering, makes no difference in terms of the constitutional cost: Either way, the right to vote is impaired, as voters cast votes in what is, in essence, a pre-decided election. The consequences of such pinpoint redistricting are profound. Every two years an election is held for the nation's 435 congressional seats. But in reality, thanks in significant part to clever redistricting, only a few dozen Congressional seats are truly up for grabs. The rest are guaranteed to the candidate of one party or the other - and usually by a margin of 20% or more. All this makes the trip to the polling place a nearly pointless exercise -- except in a symbolic sense -- for tens of millions of voters. The Pernicious Problem of Incumbents Preserving Their Seats Moreover, if you're a candidate trying to unseat an incumbent, forget it. These candidates enjoy both artificially safe districts and the inherent advantage in fundraising that comes from incumbency. That's a virtually unbeatable double-barreled advantage Sadly, even states that aren't engaged in partisan gerrymandering, tend to still be engaged in incumbent-favoring gerrymandering. In California, for example, electoral lines were not redrawn via computer to tilt the scales toward one political party or another. But they were redrawn to ensure re-election for all California's congressional incumbents by carving out districts containing a majority of their likely supporters. The need to run for re-election is meant to keep the incumbent honest, and responsive to voter needs. When re-election is improperly guaranteed, the way is opened even further for corruption and for capture by special interests. Proponents of campaign finance reform are concerned about these problems -- but even if they were to succeed in all their efforts, gerrymandering might still allow these evils into Congress, through another door. Pre-Set Elections In A Deeply-Divided Country: Why It's Especially Troubling In sum, the arteries of our democracy are hardening. And the process is all the more tragic given that the country is narrowly and deeply divided politically. Indeed, ironically, the non-competitiveness of so many general election races actually increases the destructive polarization of our body politic. -- in several ways At the state level, the process of partisan gerrymandering creates the kind of deep resentments that undermine sound policymaking. But this is only part of the problem. Real competition now occurs not in the general election but at the threshold stage of party primaries, which are dominated by Republican and Democratic party activists. These primaries tend to produce Democrats who are to the left of the center of their own party, and Republicans who are to the right of the center of their party. Thanks to gerrymandering, these candidates still win in general election walkovers, despite their relatively extreme views. And as a result, we end up with a Congress that, in aggregate, is more polarized than the electorate as a whole. And a Congress composed of extremists on both sides of the aisle is hardly likely to come up with the kind of reasoned compromises that will truly reflect the views of the electorate. Moderates speak to one another; extremists simply declare war. Why the Supreme Court Should Intervene in the Political Thicket of Gerrymandering The question remains, of course, whether all this is any of the Supreme Court's business. Judicial conservatives have long argued that the Court should stay out of the "thicket" of politics as much as possible - and the state of Pennsylvania argued just that at the Court during the recent oral argument in Vieth. Still, a strong case can be made for judicial intervention. Granted, Justices favoring judicial restraint (such as Felix Frankfurter) have warned in almost apocalyptic terms against judicial policing of election processes. But in practice their fears (Bush v. Gore notwithstanding) have generally gone unrealized. Baker v. Carr and other Warren era decisions established the principle of one-person/one-vote. Can it be seriously argued today that these decisions were wrong to do so? To the contrary, as powerfully advocated by John Hart Ely, the recently deceased author of the groundbreaking book Democracy and Distrust, the Court is on the soundest theoretical footing when it ensures the fairness and truly democratic nature of the political processes. As Ely recognized, by actively policing the procedural channels of democracy, the Court enhances the legitimacy of the substantive laws that elected legislators ultimately devise. Put another way, the Court is properly concerned with policing the sausage-making process, even if it ought to stay out of the fight over the ingredients. In the modern era, the Court already has tacitly recognized this point when it comes to racial gerrymandering. Laudably, it has declared unconstitutional redistricting plans designed to dilute the voting strength of black voters, thereby preventing the election of black candidates. And, more controversially, it has also struck down gerrymandering designed to facilitate the election of minority candidates, even in regions of the country where minorities suffered historic discrimination. In sum, the Court has made very clear that, in its eyes, all race-based gerrymandering is unconstitutional, and that the Court will fully enforce that constitutional precept. It should do the same for political gerrymandering -- which is almost as dangerous and pernicious. The Court has made very clear that it is wrong to effectively disenfranchise minority voters by drawing district boundaries in a way that dilutes the effectiveness of their votes. Given that fact, why is it not also unconstitutional to use the same kind of tactics to disenfranchise voters on the basis of their political affiliations and beliefs? In both cases, the principle of equal voting rights is seriously compromised. This is a problem that the Framers would readily recognize. In setting up our republican system, one of the British political practices they sought to eliminate was the system of "rotten" boroughs that undermined true representative government in England. The safe seats created by political gerrymandering are the modern counterparts to the rotten boroughs of that era. Recently, in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, the Supreme Court upheld the main provisions of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law. In so doing, the Court recognized Congress's authority to fight the corrupting influence of money on electoral politics. The Court ought to follow up on this brave move by striking down Pennsylvania's challenged redistricting plan. If it does so, then it will be striking its own blow against the corrupting influences of partisanship and incumbent self-preservation on the same process. From an institution that has not always been a friend to democracy, that would be a welcome blow indeed.
Wall Street Journal Gerrymandering is one of the most important factors
influencing elections today. And now it appears that the practice of
drawing the often bizarrely shaped districts is about to cement Republican
control of the House for at least the rest of this decade.
Washington Post If you think last week's U.S. Supreme Court decision on campaign finance pleased no one, just wait until the justices weigh in on congressional redistricting. The specific issue on which the court heard arguments Wednesday is the 19-district map of Pennsylvania, drawn up in 2002 by the Republican-controlled state Legislature. Democrats, with a 445,000 statewide voter edge over Republicans, hold only seven of the 19 seats. The reason is obvious - and admitted. The Republicans drew the district boundaries to maximize their political advantage. The court, which has long held that it's perfectly fine to take politics into account in drawing congressional and other districts, is being asked by Democrats to say the Pennsylvania plan is too political. It is, of course, but it's hard to see how the court could bring itself to do anything about it. Which doesn't mean it won't try. Asked a decade ago to consider whether the North Carolina Legislature was too race-conscious in producing a districting map that gave the state its first black U.S. representatives since Reconstruction, the court said yes. The shape of the district from which Democrat Mel Watt was first elected - in some places no wider than Interstate 85 - was, to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's mind, unconstitutionally "bizarre." Subsequent clarifications seemed to say that while legislatures are forbidden to engage in racial gerrymandering, they may draw districting maps calculated to satisfy any number of interests, including partisan advantage and protection of incumbents. What the court seems not to have counted on is the increased sophistication of computers, which now are capable of slicing and dicing states, as National Public Radio's Nina Totenberg put it the other day, "block by block and even house by house ... (based on) party registration, previous voting patterns, income, charitable contributions, subjects of interest and even buying patterns of the people who live in those houses. The result is that the designer can tell with near certainty which way those voters will cast their ballots." Will the court tell legislators they can't use this powerful information? A couple of states have tried to reduce blatant partisanship by giving the redistricting task to either nonpartisan (Iowa) or bipartisan (New Jersey) commissions. Both try to keep districts reasonably compact. Iowa tries where possible to respect county lines. But these state efforts at bipartisanship and civility are not easily written into a judicial decree. Give the district-drawing power to politicians, and you've got to expect a political result. It's worse than that. Staff the commissions with politically neutral paragons, and the problem remains. Should new districts, drawn after each decennial census, be as little changed as possible from the old? Should there be a requirement to draw them in a way to elect representatives in proportion to statewide party registration? Should community of interest be an overriding concern, and, if so, is race a proxy for community of interest? All these questions suggest a standard when in fact there is none. Some of the justices, to judge from their questions during oral argument, seemed to think there should be. Justices Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens, in particular, seemed uncomfortable with the inability of a party with a clear majority to win a majority of the seats. Florida, for instance, has enough of a Democratic edge that it can elect two Democratic senators. But Republicans, who drew the district maps, hold an 18-7 advantage in the congressional delegation. Unfair? Arguably. But as Justice Antonin Scalia put it, "How unfair is unfair?" Is it finally a matter of politics, and no concern of the courts? Can the Supreme Court deliver itself of an opinion that reasonable people can follow, or will it get stuck in the role as supreme mapmaker? Can partisan heavy-handedness reach the point where the Supreme Court will find it a violation of its own one-person, one-vote dictum? And will whatever the court decides in the Pennsylvania case save it from having to deal with equally problematic Texas, where outnumbered Democratic legislators twice absconded from the state in order to prevent a quorum and, temporarily, block a redistricting bill? I can't wait.
Washington Post Oral arguments in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer last week largely escaped public notice, because they took place the day the Supreme Court handed down its landmark campaign finance decision. Yet the case is crucial, and for the same broad reason that the campaign finance decision was crucial. Like the McCain-Feingold case, Vieth asks the Supreme Court to consider some of the most basic ground rules for democratic government in America: in this instance, whether the Constitution imposes any meaningful restraint on state legislatures' rigging of congressional elections by manipulating legislative districts. The court has hesitated to intervene in such matters, but redistricting is so out of control that court action is warranted. Gerrymandering is nothing new. States are required to use the decennial census to redraw districts, and parties in power long have used the opportunity to give themselves every advantage. But sophisticated computer technology now makes it possible to draw lines with unprecedented precision. As a result, elections for the House of Representatives have become something of a farce; results of almost all of them can be predicted the day the districts get drawn. Voting is little more than a formality. As more and more representatives answer only to their base, partisanship in Washington grows and compromise is frowned upon. In 1986 the Supreme Court said that partisan gerrymandering might be unconstitutional if it were so bald as to effectively foreclose political participation by one side or the other. Since then, though, no gerrymandering has been found to sink to that level. Courts have taken a hands-off approach, regarding the steady erosion of democracy as merely the rough-and-tumble of electoral politics. While race-conscious gerrymandering has received probing judicial scrutiny, grossly partisan gerrymandering has not. That ought to change. Redistricting that renders voters superfluous should not be acceptable when it marginalizes voters on account of their views, instead of their race. Following the 2000 census, Republicans in Pennsylvania unapologetically undertook to rid their state of as many congressional Democrats as possible. It wasn't easy: Pennsylvania has more Democrats than Republicans. Its electorate is capable of voting for candidates of either party statewide; it went for Al Gore in the presidential race even as it has two Republican senators. Its House delegation was almost evenly split prior to redistricting. Now, however, it has 12 Republican representatives and seven Democrats. To accomplish this, the legislature packed many Democratic voters into safe districts, dispersed others among districts with solid Republican majorities and made sure that Democratic incumbents would have to run against one another to stay in office. The court's understandable inclination to stay out of partisan disputes has become untenable in cases like this, because the redistricting system cannot be fixed by traditional political means. How many politicians are going to renounce the delicious power to pick their own voters? And what majority party will forswear in the name of reform a guarantee to retain the majority? Voters cannot register an objection -- cannot meaningfully support reform -- if the elections they vote in are all but predetermined. The court should draw its own line at the Pennsylvania gerrymandering; ot |