IRV Supporter Elected Aspen Mayor ??? FairVote's Moon on Aspen Public Radio
The victor is taking the issue of reforming the city"s election system seriously, as the Aspen Daily News reports:
"Ireland said one of his first priorities as mayor would be election reform. Ireland wants to switch mayoral races to instant runoff voting, where voters would rank candidates, thereby nullifying the need for runoff elections."Following the election, the Aspen Times opined that fixing the city"s current runoff system should be at the top of the agenda, saying, "as we've seen in the past few elections, the runoffs don't produce any different results and they invariably draw fewer voters."
Aspen Public Radio aired a piece on the election this morning, and it features an interview with FairVote program director David Moon. David thinks he sounds like he has a frog in his throat, but you should check it out anyway.
Comments currently closed for IRV Supporter Elected Aspen Mayor ??? FairVote's Moon on Aspen Public Radio
-
Posted by Jack, 2007-06-13 00:34:58 (6 years ago)
-
IRV and STV are identical in terms of mathematics. Multiseat STV was first applied to a parliamentary election in the state of Tasmania in 1897. The first use of IRV in a parliamentary election was a federal by-election in 1918. Note that Green's paper correctly states that IRV instituted for federal elections to maintain, not create, the two-party system in Australia where traditionally there have been separate parties for urban and rural conservatives. This confirms Shugart's point that voting systems tend to be altered to reflect changes in the party system, not create them. As with the claim that IRV was introduced in Australia to create the two party system, arguing that multiseat STV is an afterthought to IRV requires an event in 1918 to cause an effect in 1897.
Posted by Alan, 2007-06-12 20:04:27 (6 years ago) -
Advocates of range/approval voting, Condorcet-compliant methods, Borda, etc., etc., always seem oddly ambivalent or indifferent about multi-member districts and PR. They act as if either (1) district magnitude isn't an interesting problem, or (2) district magnitude is given in nature and just one of the parameters of the puzzle to be solved. See this Center for Range Voting page for an example. One reason for this is the fact that the choice between winner-take-all and PR doesn't pose the kinds of mathematically interesting puzzles that are posed by the paradox of voting and its many theoretical progeny. That's all from the voting theoretician's perspective. From the electoral reformer's perspective, district magnitude is the interesting problem. For legislative bodies, you have to decide between PR and winner-take-all before you can start examining the properties of various methods for doing one or the other. Interestingly, chosing PR sidesteps the paradox of voting entirely. It doesn't matter that no one slate has majority support. Within the limit set by the district magnitude, any number of slates can win representation. I think that's one reason the voting theorists aren't interested in it; it deprives them of their fundamental puzzle. IRV (or whatever single-winner method you favor) is important in the U.S. for two reasons. First, executive branch elections are far more important than in many other democracies. Second, single-member districts are deeply entrenched and we need to improve these elections in the short run, even though we would prefer PR in the (hopefully not too much) longer run. One last historical note: IRV was invented in the first place by looking at the special case of choice voting (STV outside the U.S.) where the number of seats equals one, As far as I know, with the other methods favored by voting theorists it's the other way around. The multi-seat version is an afterthought, cooked up only because real activists keep bringing up PR.
Posted by Bob Richard, 2007-06-12 14:06:19 (6 years ago) -
I suspect that if Approval Voting were ever applied to a public election it would also degrade to plurality. Let's use the example of a Florida in 2000 that has only 3 voters, one Republican, one Green and one Democrat. I can see no logics by which the Republican would vote for Gore or Nader, the Democrat would vote for Bush or the Green would vote for Bush. That leaves the possible results as: Bush 1 Gore 1 Nader 1 Bush 1 Gore 2 or 1 Nader 2 or 1 In what possible universe would the Democrat cast a second vote knowing it could only elect Nader, or for that matter, would the Green cast a second vote knowing it could only elect Gore. An extra vote that can elect an opponent is not a horse I'd put a lot of money on. Under Approval Voting the parties are going to campaign very hard for their supporters to cast a single vote. Asking their supporters to cast extra votes can only weaken a party's chances of success. Knowing the actual effect of a second vote requires precognition.
Posted by Alan, 2007-06-11 12:31:20 (6 years ago) -
IRV degrades toward plurality, because top-ranking anyone other than your favorite major party candidate is more likely to hurt you than help you. That???s a mathematical fact - and it might explain why IRV has consistently led to two-party duopoly in every country where it has seen long-term widespread use.
Clay, IRV tends toward two-party systems not because it's IRV (all of us in the blogosphere know how much you hate that evil little voting system), but because it still uses winner-take-all, single-member districts. The Duverger rule remains in operation. Range voting overcomes the Duverger rule by making it possible for a miniscule fraction of voters to overrule the majority. That's why it will never be adopted for public elections. Anyone who's taken a civics class will revolt at the idea. If minor party representation is what you really care about, you'd be better off helping the PR movement get STV or MMP. Trashing the heck out of IRV every time it comes up on your Google alerts is just plain counterproductive.Posted by Jack, 2007-06-11 09:55:01 (6 years ago) -
Alan, My claims that IRV leads to two-party duopoly are certainly not unsupported. I explained the relatively obvious point that a strong third party candidate can more easily beat the most similar major party candidate, in the penultimate round, than he can the opposing major party candidate in the final round. This means voters are strategically forced not to top-rank third party candidates unless they are sure they can't win against their favorite major party candidate anyway. And so IRV degrades toward plurality voting, and results in two-party domination. This is exquisitely explained in more formal mathematical language here: http://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html http://rangevoting.org/IRVStratPf.html#irv But again, if you don't buy the math, a look at decades of IRV usage in Australia, Ireland, Malta, and Fiji proves that it does indeed result in two-party domination, like the theory says. And Australia's third parties are quite well aware of this I should add: http://RangeVoting.org/AusIRV.html Your quote seems misleading. Aussies call STV _and_ IRV "preferential voting". The "optional" form means that voters don't have to rank all the candidates, as they normally do. This can be a headache when, as in one infamous AU election, there were 77 candidates in a single race, and voters had to rank them all. So it makes perfect sense that Greens would support the option to not rank all the candidates. This is also an advantage to the Labor Party, which being the most like our Democratic Party is presumably the most similar major party to the AU Greens. According to the Australian analysts at http://www.australianpolitics.com/voting/systems/preferential.shtml the "Disadvantages of the Preferential [IRV] System" are 1. It is more complicated to administer and count. 2. It can produce a higher level of informal voting. 3. It promotes a two-party system to the detriment of minor parties and independents. ** 4. Voters are forced to express a preference for candidates they may not wish to support in any way. * (The use of optional preferential voting, as used in New South Wales State elections, is a solution to this problem.) Do you think AustralianPolitics.com is in on the conspiracy? You note correctly that Australians don't make mention of getting Approval Voting in single-winner races. This is because they want to get proportional representation at all levels of government. When I called the AU Green Party, the woman I spoke with explained that they have such pervasive proportional representation that increasing other political bodies to have it was a more important immediate objective, and the idea of breaking two-party duopoly in single-winner posts (like mayor) was therefore an afterthought. And let's not take our eye off the ball here - they understand that IRV leads to two-party domination. But we _know_ that Approval Voting NEVER EVER strategically prevents a voter from supporting his sincere favorite candidate, even if that candidate is in a third party. That's a lot better for third parties than a plurality+runoff election, which has managed to break duopoly in most of the 27 countries where it's used. So we have every reason to believe Approval Voting will do what IRV has not and will not.
Posted by Clay Shentrup, 2007-06-09 08:10:05 (6 years ago) -
I'm surprised to learn the Australian Greens regard your unsupported claims as established fact. I am especially surprised because Clause 28.2 of their constitution reads: 'The vote will be by an optional preferential system.' The AG policy Document 'Constitutional Reform and Democracy' does not mention Approval Voting. Searching the Australian Greens website returns no mention of Approval Voting. I consulted a friend who is a branch secretary within the AG structure. He has never heard of Approval Voting. Australians generally speak of optional preferential voting when Americans talk about IRV. The two party system came into existence in Australia's federal parliament between 1900 and 1911. Preferential voting was first used at a general election of MHRs in 1919. It would be an unusual cause to work backwards in time. I suggest you welcome me to election science when there is some factual element to your claims. I do not regard IRV as an especially good electoral system, but it is far and away the best method of electing a single winner. I believe in multimember districts using STV. Approval Voting has nothing to offer in a multimember district. You may care to look at http://fruitsandvotes.com/?p=344 for a brief critique of Approval Voting You may also care to correct the Australian page at RangeVoting.com which is, at present, laughably inaccurate. I cannot speak fr the other pages there.
Posted by Alan, 2007-06-09 01:02:24 (6 years ago) -
You have it backwards Alan. IRV degrades toward plurality, because top-ranking anyone other than your favorite major party candidate is more likely to hurt you than help you. That's a mathematical fact - and it might explain why IRV has consistently led to two-party duopoly in every country where it has seen long-term widespread use. Australia's Green Party takes this as a point of fact. The only time you can safely give a third party your first preference is if you are positive he won't win anyway, so your vote will ultimately go to your favorite major party candidate. So with IRV, the sensible strategy is a consistent one - you essentially can never do wrong to just top-rank your favorite of the two most electable candidates (virtually always the two major party candidates). But as you note, strategy is more complex with Approval Voting. And this is a good thing! First off you should note a point of fact: in Approval Voting, a vote for your favorite candidate can _never_, EVER hurt you, or that candidate. With IRV it can do both - a point IRV's supporters don't like to admit. So if you think about the 2000 election, 90% of Nader supporters strategically voted for Gore. But with Approval Voting, every single one of them could have safely voted for Nader too. This destroys the myopic idea that Approval Voting degrades to plurality. And of course if a mere 548 of the 97,488 Nader voters (who apparently voted for Nader just to show support) had also voted for Gore, then Gore would have won and they'd have had the best of both worlds - showing support for Nader, but also not getting Bush. Now you might claim that IRV would have also safely allowed them to top-rank Nader, but that's only because Nader was a weak candidate, and couldn't win anyway. Had Nader been strong enough to compete with Gore or Bush, he would have been more likely to beat Gore in the first round and then lose to Bush (whereas Gore could have beaten Bush), than to beat them both. This is an easy point to mathematically demonstrate, and it is an important reason (and there may be others) why IRV degrades to plurality and leads to two-party domination. Whereas most of the 27 countries that use a genuine runoff election have escaped duopoly. Clearly, the voting method makes all the difference. Now for a quick math lesson. The ideal strategy with Approval Voting is to think about the average "value" you feel for all the candidates, and use that as a threshold to approve everyone above that level of worth to you. Additionally, to really hone the strategy, one should try to figure out which two candidates are the clear front-runners (meaning one of them will likely be the winner) and vote for the preferred of those two, but not vote for the other - even if he dislikes or likes them both. And this is fine. Even if we give IRV the benefit of the doubt, and just assume (incorrectly, in my opinion) that vastly more voters will be strategic with Approval Voting than with IRV, Approval Voting _still_ picks better (more socially beneficial/satisfying) winners. See http://RangeVoting.org/vsi.html Everything I'm saying here is pretty straightforward and easy to prove. Anyone in a third party can call up the Australian Green Party and ask them, "Does IRV lead to two-party duopoly?" I know what they'll say, because I've done it. Why do you think the Libertarian Reform Caucus calls IRV a "bullet in the foot"? Why do you think Dartmouth University just used Approval Voting to elect a member to the Board of Trustees at the behest of a professor emeritus of mathematics there? Why do you think a Princeton math Ph.D. formed the Center for Range Voting (Approval is the simplest form of Range Voting)? Welcome to the wonderful world of election science.
Posted by Clay Shentrup, 2007-06-08 13:56:03 (6 years ago) -
Appeoval Voting is a gravely deficient system that forces voters to make guesses about what the outcome what will be before they can cast a rational vote. In that way it is no different from FPTP but it is more prone to unexpected results.
Posted by Alan, 2007-06-08 00:13:51 (6 years ago) -
A far simpler and better method than IRV is Approval Voting. It uses the simple ballots we're all used to, but lets us vote for as many candidates as we like. It's simpler and cheaper than IRV, and works on standard voting machines. And it eliminates the spoiler effect, whereas IRV only reduces it.
Posted by Clay Shentrup, 2007-06-07 17:48:28 (6 years ago)
Bob, your point (1) is spot-on. And your further point about the novelty of seemingly 'more interesting problems' is equally spot-on. Sometimes I wonder if all the railing against IRV by so-called champions of fair elections isn't just a function of their discovery of novel mathematical anomalies. If the nay-sayers were really champions of fair elections, they would do a few things: (1) promote their reform on its own merits rather than at the expense of otherwise advancing reforms, (2) unify the cause rather than create division and (3) treat the fundamental and not-so-esoteric question of multi-seat districts with a modicum of seriousness. It's time to drop the vanity and get serious about real, fundamental, effective electoral reform.